

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Tuesday, January 12, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, 1501 W. Washington – Conference Room 119 A/B

Conference Call: 602-452-3288 Access Code: 8013

[WebEx Link](#) [CSSC Homepage](#)

AGENDA

10:00 a.m.	Call to Order/ Welcome and Introductions	<i>Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair</i>
10:15 a.m. Page 3	Review of Administrative Order 2015-104; Charge of Committee	<i>Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair</i>
10:25 a.m.	Status of Court Security in the USA	<i>Timm Fautsko, NCSC</i>
10:55 a.m.	Review of Publications & Materials	<i>Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair</i>
11:00 a.m. Page 7	Discussion: Benchmarking Security Standards What Other States Do / NCSC Best Practices What Do We Want to Do	<i>Timm Fautsko, NCSC</i> <i>All</i>

Noon **Working Lunch: Minnesota Security Survey; Work Group Formation**

1:00 p.m. Page 43	Web-Based Survey Best Practices	<i>Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair</i> <i>Jennifer Albright, Staff</i>
1:10 p.m.	Breakout: Small Working Group Discussions <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Courthouse Security (<i>John F. Phelps</i>)• Courtroom Security (<i>Honorable Kyle Bryson</i>)• Courthouse Perimeter Security (<i>Rolf Eckel</i>)• Court Security Training (<i>Faye Guertin</i>)	<i>All</i>
1:45	Small Group Report Back	<i>All</i>
1:55 p.m.	Announcements/Call to the Public	<i>Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair</i>
	Adjournment	<i>Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair</i>

Next Meeting: February 22, 2016 - 10:00 a.m.
Arizona State Courts Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

All times are approximate. The Chair reserves the right to set the order of the agenda. For any item on the agenda, the Committee may vote to go into executive session as permitted by Arizona Code of Judicial Administration § 1-202. Please contact Jennifer Albright, staff to the Court Security Standards Committee, at (602) 452-3453, with any questions concerning this agenda. Persons with a disability may request a reasonable accommodation, such as auxiliary aids or materials in alternative formats, by contacting Sabrina Nash at (602) 452-3849. Requests should be made as early as possible to allow time to arrange for the accommodation.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

In the Matter of:)
)
ESTABLISHING THE COURT) Administrative Order
SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE) No. 2015 - 104
AND APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS)
)
_____)

The Arizona Supreme Court’s strategic agenda, “Advancing Justice Together” recognizes that courthouses must be a safe place for all who enter their doors. Goal 3, Improving Court Processes to Better Serve the Public, calls for the establishment of courthouse and courtroom security standards, a needs assessment for court security infrastructure, and training for court security officers.

The Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators have identified court security as a high-priority initiative which requires ongoing attention.

To develop court security standards for the Arizona courts, an assessment of current court security practices and supporting resources is necessary. To this end, the Administrative Office of the Courts has engaged the services of the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) to provide expert guidance in conducting a survey and developing of security standards.

Therefore, pursuant to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution,

IT IS ORDERED as follows:

1. The Court Security Standards Committee is established.
2. PURPOSE: The Committee shall:
 - a. With support from the NCSC, develop and conduct a survey on court security provisions in the Arizona courts;
 - b. Develop recommendations on standards for courthouse and courtroom security, and recommendations on officer training; and
 - c. Submit a final report by September 30, 2016.
3. MEMBERSHIP: The individuals listed in Appendix A are appointed as members of the Committee beginning upon entry of this Order and ending on December 31, 2016. The Chief Justice may appoint additional members as may be necessary.

4. MEETINGS: The Committee shall meet at the discretion of the Committee Chair. All meetings shall comply with the public meeting policy of the Arizona Judicial Branch, Arizona Code of Judicial Administration § 1-202.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Committee shall report its recommendations to the Arizona Judicial Council not later than the Arizona Judicial Council's October 2016, meeting.

Dated this 25th day of November, 2015.

SCOTT BALES
Chief Justice

Appendix A

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Chair

Marcus Reinkensmeyer
Director, Court Services Division
AOC

Members

Mary Jane Abril Security Chief Superior Court in Pima County	Robert Hughes Security Phoenix Municipal Court
Honorable Kyle Bryson Presiding Judge Superior Court in Pima County	Keith Kaplan Court Administrator Fountain Hills Municipal Court
Rick Colwell Chief Deputy Clerk Yuma County	Honorable Robert Krombeen Williams Justice Court and Williams Municipal Court
Greg DeMerritt Associate Clerk Pima County	Tina Mattison Pima Juvenile Court Administration
Rolf Eckel Superior Court Administrator Yavapai County	Law Enforcement Representative TBD
Faye Guertin Deputy Court Administrator Chandler Municipal Court	John Phelps Bar Representative
Josh Halverson Superior Court Administrator Graham County	

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

In the Matter of:)
)
APPOINTMENT OF MEMBERS TO) Administrative Order
THE COURT SECURITY STANDARDS) No. 2015 - 115
COMMITTEE) (Affecting Administrative
) Order No. 2015-104)
)
_____)

Administrative Order No. 2015-104 established the Court Security Standards Committee. The Order provides that the Chief Justice may appoint additional members as may be necessary. Therefore, after due consideration,

IT IS ORDERED that Sheriff Bill Pribil, Coconino County; Sheriff Scott Mascher, Yavapai County; and Captain Lawrence (Scott) Slade, Maricopa County Superior Court Marshall's Office are appointed as members to the Court Security Standards Committee for a term beginning upon signature of this Order, and ending December 31, 2016.

Dated this 16th day of December, 2015.

SCOTT BALES
Chief Justice



**STEPS TO BEST PRACTICES
FOR COURT BUILDING SECURITY**

PUBLISHED FEBRUARY 2010

REVISED JANUARY 2013

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A fundamental for effective court security is to have an effective Command Center with sufficient CCTVs to monitor activity on the exterior and interior of the courthouse.

Acknowledgements

The development and publication of this revised report has been made possible by the support and hard work of many people. The National Center for State Courts (NCSC) wishes to acknowledge the four authors of this document, Timothy Fautsko, Principal Staff at the NCSC and especially security consultants Steven Berson, James O’Neil, and Kevin Sheehan for their work in identifying the categories, topics and steps to best practices in court security contained in this document. The NCSC also extends its appreciation to three practitioners in the field who carefully reviewed this document and made important recommendations that have improved the final product. They are Malcolm Franklin, Senior Manager, Emergency Response and Security from the Administrative Office of Courts in California; Frank Lalley, Judicial Security Administrator from the Administrative Office of Pennsylvania Courts; and Carol Price, Court Security Director from the Administrative Office of Courts in Utah; and Steve Swensen, President of the Center for Judicial and Executive Security (CJES) in St. Paul.. Their many years of experience in the field of court security and emergency preparedness proved invaluable in validating the many steps to best practice. Without their assistance, the quality and usefulness of information contained in this report would not have been possible. Finally, the NCSC extends thanks to its editorial staff Ephanie Blair, Judy Amidon, and Lorie Gomez for the many hours they spent providing quality assurance in the conformation and final editing of the original and revised publications.

Introduction

The National Center for State Courts (NCSC), through its Court Consulting Division, has conducted security assessments of court buildings as well as personal security and safety training throughout the country. In conducting court building assessments, the NCSC assessment team has evaluated court security in terms of “best practices” – guidelines describing those security measures that should be in place with respect to a comprehensive set of topics covering court buildings and court operations. These best practices are not only based on the considerable experience of NCSC assessment team members, but are also a compilation of various guidelines from the U.S. Marshals Service, National Sheriffs’ Association, International Association of Chiefs of Police, the Transportation Safety Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, and the National Association for Court Management. The NCSC assessment team recommends that leadership in every court building strive to achieve best practices in all topic areas to provide a suitable level of security for all those who work in or visit the court building.

Acknowledging that implementing best practices in court building security will require increasingly scarce budgetary resources, the NCSC assessment team has developed steps in phases that can be taken toward achieving best practices in various areas of court building security. These steps may be a useful approach to courts as they strive to implement improvements in court building security. The NCSC assessment team wishes to emphasize that a fully effective integrated level of security will be reached only when all the measures at the best practices level are incorporated. The NCSC assessment team has provided these steps in phases, so that a court at its discretion can adopt incremental improvements before reaching the level of best practices. These steps in phases are plateaus along an ascending path to improvement – improvement the NCSC assessment team recommends that courts achieve over time.

It is important to note that *Steps to Best Practices* focuses almost exclusively on security matters. With rare exception, issues of emergency preparedness, continuity of operations, and disaster recovery are not within the scope of this document.

Security is not a one-time achievement. It is a serious and continuous goal and requires constant vigilance. Further, it must be a number one priority every single day for all those interested and involved in the process. The risks involved in court building operations are great and varied, and generally can never be eliminated. However by exercising due diligence and devoting the appropriate attention, incidents can be both minimized and mitigated. Adhering to the stated principles and recommendations contained the Steps to Best Practices document will greatly assist the courts in this regard.

Steps to Best Practices is organized by steps, phases, topics, and categories. It will be helpful for the reader at the outset to have a working understanding of each of these terms:

- Steps: These are specific buildings blocks, specific actions that courts can take to improve security.
- Phases: These are logical groupings of steps forming a temporary plateau in terms of security measures in place.
- Topics: These are the subject areas into which steps in phases are organized.
- Categories: These are sets of topics. There are four categories listed in priority order. (*Note: Topics within each category are listed in alphabetical rather than priority order.*)
 - Category A: These are fundamental topics that must be addressed first in order to provide a base on which to place all of the others.
 - Category B: These are topics that are critical topics to address.
 - Category C: These are topics that are essential topics to address.
 - Category D: These are topics that are important to address.

CATEGORIES AND TOPICS

Topic #

Category A: Fundamental

One	Command Center
Two	Policies and procedures
Three	Security committee

Category B: Critical

One	Access of people into court building
Two	After-hours access to court building
Three	Chambers
Four	Courtrooms
Five	Court security officer (CSO) staffing levels
Six	Duress alarms
Seven	Threat and incident reporting
Eight	In-custody defendants
Nine	Training

Category C: Essential

One	Closed circuit television (CCTV)
Two	Emergency equipment and procedures
Three	Interior access during business hours (circulation zones)
Four	Intrusion detection systems
Five	Jurors
Six	Parking (particularly for judges)
Seven	Public counters and offices

Category D: Important

One	Cash handling
Two	Exterior/interior patrols
Three	Perimeter issues
Four	Public lobbies, hallways, stairwells, and elevators
Five	Screening mail and packages

Category A: Fundamental

The three topics in this category provide an essential foundation for all the other topics in *Steps to Best Practices*.

- **Command Center.** Without such a center, the necessary and vital technological tools for court building security – closed circuit televisions (CCTV*), duress alarms, and intrusion alarms – cannot be utilized, integrated, or monitored in an effective manner.
- **Policies and procedures.** Without these, there is no way to assure a thorough and consistent application of security measures aimed at making a court building reasonably safe. The development of policies and procedures is an iterative process. Reference will need to be made to the information included in *Steps to Best Practices* to further the process of developing a comprehensive and cohesive set of policies and procedures.
- **Security committee.** Without such a committee, meeting regularly and empowered to exercise oversight and sustain matters related to security within the court building, it is difficult, if not impossible, to properly assess and address the myriad of security challenges facing court leadership.

**CCTV, as used in this document, refers to a variety of technologies. For detail, see topic C-1.*

TOPIC A-1: COMMAND CENTER

Phase One

1. Establish a command center in the lobby area of the court building with an assigned court security officer (CSO*). For smaller court buildings, the monitoring function of a command center can take place at the front entrance screening station.
2. Provide for telephone/radio communication as a point of contact between a CSO and potentially vulnerable areas of the court building, such as courtrooms.

**Note: CSO is defined as an individual trained in court security and certified to use a firearm and intermediate weapons, i.e. Taser or baton or restraints, i.e. handcuffs, leg restraints. The CSO should also be armed with a triple-retention holster and a radio that can communicate with the command center. The CSO assigned to the command center is not necessarily required to carry a firearm.*

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

3. Design and construct a command center that is both centrally and strategically located within the courts building.
4. Design a control panel that provides for administrative activities, system integration, and equipment to monitor CCTV cameras, intrusion detection systems, duress alarms, fire alarms or building alerts, and communication dispatches.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phase One and Two, plus add the following:

5. Install control panels and monitoring equipment for CCTV surveillance cameras, duress alarms, fire alarms or alerts, intrusion detection systems, and telephone and radio communication and dispatch.
6. Provide additional security personnel as required to supervise and monitor command center activities.

TOPIC A-2: POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Phase One

1. Judicial branch leadership understands the need for and commits to the implementation of effective, comprehensive security based on best practice models and establishes orders directing court security policies and procedures.

Phase Two

Continue with the step in Phase One, plus add the following:

2. Establish a task force under the direction of the court security committee (see Topic A-3) and with the cooperation of the appropriate law enforcement agency(s), draft essential documents for the establishment of the policies and procedures on court building security. The task force on policies and procedures should include:
 - Court administration
 - Law enforcement and security personnel
 - Facilities management
 - Emergency responders
 - Designated court security stakeholders
3. Create the package of essential documents to include:
 - Policies and procedures
 - Overall court security operations.
 - Screening protocols.
 - Define weapons, illegal items/contraband prohibited from the court building, to include confiscation, seizure and removal processes.

- Procedures should include final disposition of confiscated items.
- Procedures to govern courtrooms and other areas in the event of a security incident.
- Risk assessment and resource allocation instruments and protocols. Incident reporting instruments and protocols.
- Operations manuals and contingency plans (e.g. active-shooter, security threats, incident response, etc.), training manuals, and materials.
- Administrative orders with revision authority.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

4. Establish communication to stakeholders that allows for feedback and adjustments as follows:
 - Assign a liaison between task force and stakeholders.
 - Provide periodic briefings in various formats to stakeholders.
 - Solicit formal feedback from stakeholders.
 - Adjust package (e.g., policies, procedures, manuals, materials) as necessary. Adjust documents package (e.g. policies, procedures, specific manuals, etc.) as necessary.

Phase Four

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three; plus add the following:

5. Provide training and evaluate the documents package as follows:
 - Train officials and stakeholders having direct roles and involvement in court security.
 - Conduct scheduled and unscheduled drills and exercises to test procedures.
 - Evaluate results of the drills.
 - Evaluate results on the response to actual incidents.
 - Modify the documents package to achieve the stated intent and purpose behind policies and procedures.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, Three, and Four; plus add the following:

6. At minimum review and update policies and procedures on a bi-annual basis and after major incidents, events, and facility renovation projects.
7. Analyze Phases Two through Four for operational effectiveness.

TOPIC A-3: SECURITY COMMITTEE

Phase One

1. Establish a court security committee for the court building, to be chaired by a judge (preferably presiding) and has a membership of at least the primary security provider, such as the sheriff or CSO, the clerk of court, and the court administrator.
2. The judge or court administrator should meet regularly with court security personnel and law enforcement officials to discuss security concerns and improve security at the court building.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

3. Add the district attorney and public defender or representative from the state bar to the court security committee.
4. As appropriate add other tenants (especially for Government Centers housing court operations) as members of the security committee.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

5. Add elected officials to the court security committee.
6. Use ad hoc members to serve on committee designated task forces.
7. Undertake a self-assessment of the security in place within the court building. Checklists with which to conduct these assessments are available from various sources, such as the National Sheriff's Association. Assistance in conducting assessments is also available from the NCSC.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three; plus add the following:

8. Establish an integrated court security committee and form task force groups to provide the committee with additional research and information gathering capacity. Additional members added to the committee or task forces should include:
 - Court staff members working in the court building
 - Local and state government officials
 - Local and state subject matter experts

9. Reconstitute the court security committee to be additionally responsible for emergency preparedness, disaster recovery/continuity of operations plan (COOP), and response to pandemic flu, and add members with this expertise as appropriate. Rename the committee the court security and emergency preparedness committee.
10. Add security-based planning responsibility under the committee for courts design, construction, improvement, and renovation projects.

Category B: Critical

TOPIC B-1: ACCESS OF PEOPLE INTO COURT BUILDING

Phase One

1. Establish only one main entrance through which the public can enter the court building. Post signage at the main entrance that states all persons are subject to search by security. This signage should also include a listing of those items prohibited from the facility.
 - Designate one or more of the doors to the building to be used only for one or more of the following: judges, court staff, and other building tenants, to enter with an access card or key. Lawyers and jurors should not be permitted to use this door but should enter through the public entrance.
 - Keep all other exterior doors locked during all hours, including business hours.
 - Emergency exit bars should be installed on all external exit doors. All exit doors should be alarmed, with ten second delay consistent with local codes. Alarms should sound at the command center. Establish signage that explains the “Exit Only” requirement. Avoid panic bar alarms with a “local alarm” feature in favor of an alarm that sounds in the command and control center.)
2. Establish protocol for entry (i.e. controlled access) through secured doors.
 - Policies and procedures will need to be developed and enforced on “tailgating” or bringing in family members and friends. “Tailgating” should never be allowed.
 - Delivery people and contractors should enter through the main door and be verified by an authorized representative requesting the delivery or service. The same procedure should be followed after verification at the main door to the court building for delivery people and contractors needing to use other external doors for service or delivery. These individuals should be escorted and supervised while in the building.

**Note: In this context, tailgating is when an individual(s) enters a court building with a person who is authorized to properly gain entry with an access card or key.*

3. Dedicate a full-time CSO position to secure the main public entrance to the court building.
4. Until a screening station design can be constructed, set up a temporary table and other physical structures (e.g. stanchion ropes, dividers, etc.) to serve as the screening station. Ensure that sight lines from the screening station and the building entrance/exit are unobstructed to allow for appropriate visual assessment and security response.
5. Screen people coming in the public entrance for weapons by use of a hand wand and physical search of personal items.
 - Provide screener with a weapons ID chart.
 - Provide screener with a list of contraband items.
 - Provide screener with a listing of daily court activities.
6. Train the CSO for all Phase One tasks described above.
7. Provide basic court security orientation training for judges and staff.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

8. Add a magnetometer at the main door (public entrance) to the court building.
9. Per system manufacturer specifications conduct a daily testing and inspection of the magnetometer. Recalibrate the magnetometer as necessary. This should be preferably conducted by a supervisor who has received the required training.
10. Train CSO(s) in all tasks added in Phase Two, plus provide additional security training for judges, staff, jurors, and others.
11. Replace keys to the court building with access cards for judges, authorized court staff, and other building tenants' staff. Assignment of access cards must be restricted to an "as required basis as determine by the court's administrative authority.
12. Install a CCTV camera at the main door (public entrance) to the court building.
13. Assign a second CSO* to assist with screening at the main entrance during high-traffic times of the day. During the day, a second CSO occasionally should conduct internal and external walk-around patrols and assist with courtroom security and security monitoring at the judge and authorized staff entrances.
14. Establish a direct line of communication between law enforcement and the courts so screening personnel are aware of potentially dangerous individuals.
15. Add a duress alarm, telephone and gun lockers at the screening station.
16. Establish a policy that law enforcement officers and plain clothes officers entering the court building on personal business may not bring in a weapon. As well as when plain-clothes officers testifying. Officers that are in plain clothes and present in the court on official business to testify in court, must show valid police identification credentials and badge, along with case documentation if they are carrying a concealed weapon which should be checked at the door.

**Note: Staffing level in Phase Two is one full-time CSO at the screening station, plus one additional CSO for high-volume times.*

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

17. Install an x-ray imaging system at the public entrance screening station.
18. The second CSO referenced in step 13 should be assigned as a full-time, permanent CSO* to operate the public screening station. During slow periods, this second CSO can still be available for additional duties as described in step 13.
19. Establish additional policies and procedures for Phase Three operations as follows:
 - Conduct an annual inspection and certification of x-ray imaging system. This equipment must be registered with State health and safety agencies.
 - Provide a detailed, step-by-step manual, training, and continuing education on contemporary screening procedures.
20. Train CSOs in all tasks and provide security orientation training for judges and staff.
21. Add a CCTV camera at the judge/staff entrance door.

**Note: Staffing level in Phase Three is two full-time CSOs at the screening station.*

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

22. Assign a third CSO* to operate the public screening station: one CSO to operate the magnetometer, one to operate the x-ray imaging system, and one to handle problems. During low traffic times, the third CSO can assume another assignment. Ideally, all three CSOs should be armed, but at least one should be armed. (Armed CSOs should use a triple-retention holster.)
23. If two or more public screening stations are in operation, assign a fourth CSO as a supervisor to oversee operations.
24. Install a magnetometer, x-ray imaging system, duress alarm, and CCTV camera to the judge/staff entrance. Consider allowing jurors to use this entrance.
25. Assign at least two CSOs to the judges/staff entrance if staff or jurors use this entrance and at peak hours during the day. Otherwise, assign at least one CSO.
26. Establish a universal screening policy. Universal screening means everyone entering the building is screened.
27. When everything is in place, establish a policy that only law enforcement officers with responsibility for court security inside the building may bring a weapon into the building. All other law enforcement officers, including those in plain clothes should be required to check their weapons in a lock box at the screening station(s).

**Note: Staffing level in Best Practice is three full-time CSOs for each public screening station, plus one additional CSO to supervise multiple stations, and two CSOs assigned to judge/staff/juror entrance.*

TOPIC B-2: AFTER-HOURS ACCESS TO COURT BUILDING

Phase One

1. Permit access into all areas of the court building only via key or electronic card access. Keys and cards should be issued and controlled pursuant to a comprehensive accountability system that has been approved by the court's security committee.
2. Conduct background checks prior to issuing a key or access card to any person. Background checks should be conducted prior to employment or execution of a contract. Stress that supervisors must be required to justify the issuance of a key or card. All after-hours access should be restricted as much as possible. Good security should not be set aside for convenience.
3. Conduct background checks for cleaning crews and any vendors granted after-hours access to the building. Cleaning crews and vendors should be supervised at all times by a person who is accountable to the court. To the extent possible courtrooms and chambers should be cleaned by crews/vendors during the business day with no authorized access after-hours. Cleaning crews should never be allowed to work in judge's chambers alone.
4. Document and monitor those activities where the public is required to be in the building after-hours. Set policies and procedures to ensure no unauthorized persons are in the building after-hours.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

5. Eliminate the use of keys and implement the use of an access card system. As necessary, issue keys to a limited number of people only for emergencies, building maintenance purposes, and building security responsibilities.
6. Create a single access point into the court building that is secured by a CSO who checks IDs and signs in all people entering the building after regular hours. As time permits, the CSO should periodically patrol the interior and exterior of the court building.
7. Update background checks on a regularly scheduled basis (at least annually).

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

8. Conduct full security screening operations requiring all persons to go through entryway screening.

TOPIC B-3: CHAMBERS

Phase One

1. Install a duress alarm at the judge's desk and in the chamber's reception area.
2. Test duress alarms regularly – at least monthly. Train judges and court staff know how and when to use the duress alarms in chambers.
3. Provide training to judges and court staff regarding personal security and safety in chambers.
4. Escort judges when leaving a chambers area for a courtroom if chambers hall is unsecured.
5. Keep existing chambers window coverings adjusted so activities cannot be observed from outside the court building. See enhanced security in Step 9.
6. Conduct daily sweeps of chambers in the morning and at the end of the day.
7. Keep entrance doors to chambers area locked. Keep doors to individual chambers locked when judge is not present, especially at night.
8. Assign at least one CSO or transport deputy to be present whenever an in-custody defendant is escorted through chambers hallway.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

9. Install blinds, preferably vertical, as interior window coverings in all chambers.
10. Install duress alarms in conference room(s).
11. Plan for and conduct drills regarding emergency situations in chambers area.
12. Escort judges when leaving secure chambers and courtroom area.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

13. Assign at least two CSOs or transport deputies to escort in-custody defendants through chambers hallway, with one to clear the path ahead. The transport officer assigned direct contact with the prisoner should not carry a gun, but be armed with an intermediate weapon such as a Taser or baton; the other officer should carry a firearm in a triple retention holster.
14. Install ballistic-resistant material in all accessible windows (e.g., ground level, first floor). The recommended ballistic-resistant material should meet UL Standard 752, Level IV, unless a lower level can be justified by an assessment of the risks based on such factors as adjacent structures and geographic features associated with the location of chambers. This level may be reduced based on specific security assessments.
15. Request cleaning crews to clean chambers at the end of the day when court staff is present, rather than at night.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three; plus add the following:

16. Install CCTV cameras in chambers hallways that lead to the entrance to chambers areas.
17. If feasible given the existing structure of the court building, establish a secure path for judges to go from chambers to courtroom (no escorting of in-custody defendants). If feasible, establish a secure path to escort in-custody defendants from holding cells to the courtroom without going through chambers hallways.
18. Install ballistic-resistant material in all chambers windows that are located on floors above ground level.
19. Cleaning crews should be prohibited from entering judge's chambers unsupervised at any time. Require cleaning during the day or leave waste baskets outside locked chambers area doors at night is preferred. The judge or court staff should be present when cleaning crews are physically cleaning/dusting chambers area during the day.

TOPIC B-4: COURTROOMS

Phase One

1. Assign at least one CSO on every floor that has one or more courtrooms, dedicated as a “rover” from one courtroom to the next (unless local or state rules require additional coverage). There must be at least one CSO or transport officer present throughout the entire court proceeding whenever an in-custody defendant is involved.
2. Install duress alarms in the courtroom at accessible locations:
 - On top or under the working surface of the bench, plainly marked
 - At the CSO station
 - At the clerk’s station

Train judges and staff on the functionality of duress alarms and on the protocols for use.

3. Test duress alarms regularly (at least monthly).
4. Conduct a sweep in the morning before a proceeding is held and at the end of the day for all trials to court and trials to jury. Note: In any phase, for high visibility trials use a dog trained with the ability to detect guns, bomb materials, and other explosive contraband. In addition, courtrooms should be cleared and locked during a recess. If individuals are allowed to stay in the courtroom during a recess, a CSO should be assigned to remain in the area.
5. Secure or remove all metal and glass items inside the courtroom that can be used as weapons (e.g., scissors, staplers, metal water pitchers, glasses). As substitutes for these items use Styrofoam or paper products. Use snub nose scissors, bendable pens for defendants, and smaller staplers.

6. Install and then regularly test emergency lighting/fire equipment in courtrooms.
7. Always keep front and back doors to courtrooms locked when courtroom is not in use.
8. Use proper and acceptable restraints per state law and a judge's approval on in-custody defendants.
9. Prohibit use of camera/cell phones in the courtroom and prohibit other items that could be used as weapons.
10. Install door scopes (i.e. peepholes) for the judge's entry into the courtroom.
11. Ensure weapons as exhibits are rendered inoperable. Ammunition should always be secured in sealed evidence bags separate from any firearms.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

12. Assign at least one CSO to be present in the courtroom whenever there is any court proceeding being held in the courtroom. A second CSO or transport officer should be assigned when there is an in-custody defendant present. The transport officer maintaining custody (i.e., having direct contact) of the prisoner defendant should be armed with an intermediate weapon (i.e. taser, stun gun, or baton) in lieu of a firearm. This will minimize the likelihood of an in-custody defendant obtaining a firearm during confrontations
13. Install **one** CCTV camera in criminal and family courtrooms.
 - The camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom in order to monitor activities in the courtroom up to and including the well and bench area.
14. Holding cells for the courtroom should be properly constructed and escape-proof.
15. Every three or four months, debrief incidents that have occurred in the courtrooms and review procedures related to courtroom security. This de-briefing should take place in the courtroom. There should be an immediate debriefing on any serious security incident.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

16. A second CSO should be assigned to a courtroom whenever any court proceeding is being held. Whether or not there is an in-custody defendant, one CSO should be assigned for the judge and one for the courtroom. A second CSO is not ordinarily needed for civil cases, unless specifically requested by a judge based on a determination of a higher risk involved in a particular case.
17. Install one CCTV camera in all remaining courtrooms.
 - The camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom to monitor activities in the courtroom up to and including the well and bench area.

18. Install two CCTV cameras in criminal and family courtrooms.
 - One camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom to monitor activities in the courtroom up to and including the well and bench area.
 - One camera should be installed on the wall in back of the bench to monitor activities in the courtroom.
19. Begin the process necessary to establish a courtroom in the jail for advisements/arraignments and other hearings. Use video arraignment* originating from the jail for in-custody hearings as much as permitted by state law.

**Note: Video arraignment is the preferred solution to bringing in-custody defendants back and forth for settings and brief hearings.*

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three; plus add the following:

20. For high-visibility trials, an additional CSO should be assigned to be present in the courtroom.
21. Use video or a courtroom in the detention center for all arraignments or hearings to set dates of next appearance.*

**Note: Use of video is the preferred solution to personal appearance by in-custody defendants whenever legally feasible by state law.*

22. Conduct sweeps of all courtrooms, including the random use of trained dogs.
23. Provide separate working offices (not in the courtroom) for clerks and others to use after courtroom proceedings have been completed.
24. Use bullet-resistant materials when constructing or retrofitting the bench and workstations inside the courtroom. The most recent recommended standard for these materials is UL Standard 752 Level III.
25. Install two CCTV cameras in all courtrooms.
 - One camera should be installed in the back of the courtroom to monitor activities in the courtroom up to and including the well and bench area.
 - One camera should be installed on the wall in back of the bench to monitor activities in the courtroom.

TOPIC B-5: COURT SECURITY OFFICER (CSO) STAFFING LEVELS

Phase One

1. One CSO* should be permanently assigned to the main entrance of the court building during business hours.
2. One CSO or transport deputy should be assigned to the courtroom while there is an in-custody defendant in the courtroom.

3. Assign at least one CSO on every floor that has one or more courtrooms, dedicated as a rover from one courtroom to the next. There must be at least one CSO or transport officer present throughout the entire court proceeding whenever an in-custody defendant is involved.

**Note: It is estimated that each CSO post requires approximately 1.33 full-time employees to cover for sick and annual vacation, training, etc.*

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

4. As additional CSOs become available, assign in the following priority per recommended phases leading up to Best Practices in each relevant topic:
 - To meet recommended staffing guidelines at screening station (see Topic B-1)
 - To meet recommended staffing guidelines for the courtroom (see Topic B-4)
 - To meet recommended ratios for transporting in-custody defendants (see Topic B-8)
 - To assign patrols for the interior and exterior of the building (see Topic D-2)

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phase One and Two, plus add the following:

5. Achieve full recommended staffing guidelines for the following topics:
 - Screening stations (see Topic B-1)
 - Courtrooms (see Topic B-4)
 - Transporting in-custody defendants (see Topic B-8)
 - Regular patrols of building interior and exterior (see Topic D-2)

TOPIC B-6: DURESS ALARMS

Phase One

1. Install duress alarms in the courtroom and at the bench, clerk's station, and CSO station. Training should be provided on the functionality of duress alarms and on the protocols for use.
2. Alarms should be tested at least monthly. Alarm batteries should be tested annually.

Phase Two

Continue step in Phase One, plus add the following:

3. Install alarms in each chamber and reception area.
4. Install alarms at public counters, cash areas, and other offices where the public has access, including those without counters.
5. Install alarms in the interview and mediation rooms.
6. Install alarms and 911 contact ability at the childcare center, if the court building includes such a center.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

7. Install alarms at screening stations.
8. Install an alarm in the jury assembly room.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

9. Install duress alarms in the holding cell area.
10. Install a duress alarm in the loading dock area.
11. Install a duress alarm in the mailroom.
12. Integrate duress alarm and camera systems so the closet CCTV is automatically called up for monitoring and recording when alarms are activated

TOPIC B-7: THREAT AND INCIDENT REPORTING

Phase One

1. Establish a policy requiring incidents to be reported to the appropriate law enforcement agency and to court administration as soon as feasible. The more serious the incident, the more quickly it should be reported.
2. Train CSOs and staff in the court building on how to define what an incident is and how to report incidents verbally and in writing.
3. Develop and use an incident reporting form and submit forms in writing to the proper authorities, at least on a monthly basis.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

4. Implement a practice for periodically evaluating incident reports and making improvements based on lessons learned from reports with law enforcement

officials and the chairperson of the court security committee (and the committee's incident reporting task force).

5. Provide general feedback to staff on incidents, particularly to those who reported them (e.g., complete the feedback loop).

TOPIC B-8: IN-CUSTODY DEFENDANTS

Phase One

1. Assign at least one CSO or transport deputy to escort in-custody defendant(s) through all non-secure areas and to clear the path ahead of civilians.
2. Assign one CSO or transport deputy to remain with defendant(s) in the courtroom at all times.
3. Efforts should be made to modify schedules so in-custody defendants are escorted through public areas when the presence of people is at a minimum.
4. When transporting in-custody defendant(s) in public hallways, bystanders should be moved to the far end of the hall; not to one side or the other. When transporting in-custody defendant(s) in a public elevator, the elevator should be cleared of all other people.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

5. Assign a second CSO or transport deputy to escort an in-custody defendant and clear a pathway. The transport officer closest to the prisoner should be armed with an intermediate weapon, i.e. Taser or baton; the other officer should be armed.
6. Make sure all holding cells and areas within the court building are appropriately structured, secured, staffed, and searched before and after each occupation.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

7. Install CCTV cameras along entire in-custody defendants' escort route.
8. Establish a secure sally port for in-custody defendants entering the building.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

9. Establish secure circulation for a defendant from the transport bus, through the sally port, to the holding cell and the courtroom to avoid crossing the path of judges, staff, or public.

TOPIC B-9: TRAINING

Phase One

1. CSOs should be trained in basic court security responsibilities. CSOs should receive initial classroom instruction on courtroom security techniques, judicial and staff protection, security screening activities, firearm operation, threat de-escalation techniques and safety and weapons certification.
2. CSOs should receive basic training in emergency response, first-aid, defensive tactics, handcuffing, courtroom security, hostage situations, active-shooters, and judicial protection.
3. New judges and court staff should receive an initial court security orientation briefing that includes emergency procedures, building evacuation routes, building emergency color code system, and personal safety procedures for work and home.
4. Judges and court staff should be provided with detailed instructions on reporting threats and incidents received at home or in the court building.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

5. All CSOs should receive at least 16 hours of mandatory in-service training on court security each year.
6. Establish a judge and staff security continuing education program that deals with workplace violence and personal safety techniques, courtroom security and protection, and personal safety while at work and off-site

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

7. In addition to annual familiarization and qualification courses on firearms and intermediate weapons, establish regularly schedule mandatory advanced refresher training courses for CSOs, to include such topics as emergency response, first-aid, defensive tactics, handcuffing, courtroom security, hostage situations, active-shooters, and judicial protection.
8. Establish mandatory, ongoing security and safety education programs for judges and court staff that include such topics as handling difficult people, home safety techniques, safety practices for inside and outside the court building, hostage incidents, and emergency evacuation from the court building.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

9. Establish and schedule advanced court security training programs for CSOs to include threat de-escalation, security assessments, judicial protection, incident response, dangerous individuals, mental health issues, and high threat proceedings.
10. Establish mandatory ongoing security and safety education programs for judges and court staff that include handling difficult people, high-profile trials, home safety techniques, safety practices inside and outside the court building, hostage incidents, travel safety tips, threats, and emergency evacuation from the court building.
11. Train judges and court staff on self-defense options, threat de-escalation techniques, and personal safety/security considerations during hostage situations.

Category C: Essential

TOPIC C-1: Closed Circuit Television (CCTV)

Phase One

1. Install a digital and color CCTV camera system* at the entry screening station and in the courtroom(s) facing the gallery.

**Note: CCTV systems can utilize various kinds of technology to transmit video images and to provide for system access and control. Cables have been the traditional means of system connectivity. Newer wireless, laptop based, CCTV technologies have emerged over time. Some systems now utilize an internet protocol (IP) to transmit data and control signals over a fast Ethernet link. Another technology, virtual local area network (VLAN), allows authorized personnel to access cameras or a recorder from a remote setting. Courts are encouraged to explore and adopt the ever advancing new technologies that best suit their needs and budgets.*

CCTV cameras should have the following functional capacity:

- Fixed or pan, tilt, zoom. These types of CCTV cameras are typically used by most courts. Fixed cameras with a wide-angle lens allow for a stationary focus on areas of interest. The capacity to tilt and pan allows each camera to maximize its area of coverage, thereby minimizing blind spots and the number of cameras needed. The ability to zoom allows each camera to capture a more accurate and close-up picture of what is actually transpiring in a particular scene.
- Color. This is standard in current systems. Black-and-white images cannot tell the full story. Important features are indistinguishable. Only with a color monitor can faces and other specific objects be clearly identified.
- Recording capacity. The CCTV system should have digital video recording capacity enabling a CSO to view incidences at a later time. This recording function is essential for identifying perpetrators for the purpose of apprehension as well as conviction. Recordings should be retained for at least ten working days.
- Activation capacity. The operation and recording function of a camera can be set to activate by either motion or sound, or by the setting off of duress or intrusion alarms.
- Signs. Notices should be conspicuously placed to inform the public that CCTV cameras are operating and recording activity in the area.

Phase Two

Continue the step in Phase One, plus add the following:

2. Install CCTV cameras (with tamper-resistant housings) in detention areas to monitor activities in holding cells and prisoner circulation areas.
3. Install CCTV cameras with protective environmental housings on the court building perimeter. Use CCTV system to detect suspicious activities and incidents, and to monitor parking and adjacent areas.
4. Install CCTV cameras to monitor activity at public counters and in offices where the public may visit.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

5. Install CCTV cameras at the loading dock.
6. Install CCTV cameras in hallways.
7. Install CCTV cameras in each courtroom.

Phase Four

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

8. Install CCTV cameras in elevators and stairwells.
9. Install additional CCTV cameras at security screening stations.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, Three, and Four, plus add the following:

10. Install CCTV cameras in hallways that access chambers.
11. Install CCTV cameras in the mailroom.
12. Install CCTV cameras in the childcare area, if such an area exists.
13. Install CCTV cameras to cover all pathways through which an in-custody defendant may be escorted.

TOPIC: C-2 EMERGENCY EQUIPMENT AND PROCEDURES

Phase One

1. Use emergency color codes to designate emergency procedures for evacuation. It is important that during an emergency communication should be clear, understandable, and simple. Presently, state and local courts use different warning systems and language to advise court building occupants what to do during an emergency. The decision whether to stay or leave a court building during an emergency often can be the difference between life and death. Realizing that clear communication and understandable instructions are vital, courts have been advised by the NCSC to use universal color codes and practice drills to augment their existing evacuation procedures. Using the same color-coded language in every court building will ensure that employees will understand and react properly to emergencies as well as having emergency equipment in place.

RECOMMENDED COLOR CODES

- **Code Yellow – Situational Awareness**
 - Cautionary: Be aware and prepared to react to danger.
 - A dangerous situation may be developing in the court building.
- **Code Red – Imminent Danger**
 - Stay put! An active shooter is in the court building or there is a hostage situation.
 - Get into an emergency protective posture or in a safe haven.

- **Code Green – Emergency – Evacuate Building**
 - Listen to instructions from your floor warden.
 - Report to your assigned location away from court building.

 - **Code Blue – Emergency Team Responding**
 - An emergency team is responding to or is in the court building.
 - Wait for further instructions from officials.

 - **Code White – Administrative/Informational**
 - Return to normal operations.
 - All is well.
2. Have an emergency, battery-generated lighting system in courtrooms, offices, and public areas.
 3. Have a fire extinguisher on each floor, with egress floor plans posted.
 4. Have fire alarms located on each floor.
 5. Have an elevator(s) that meets state and local fire codes, i.e., MGM fire code.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

6. Have an emergency generator system that is properly fenced-in and protected.
7. Test generator system monthly; keep a log of tests.
8. Determine the time-delay for emergency generators to “power-on” and install uninterrupted power supplies (UPS) for critical systems.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

9. Have automated external defibrillators (AEDs) located accessibly on each floor and designate a person(s) in the court building who is trained to respond to medical emergencies (e.g., CPR and use of the AED) as 911 is called.
10. Designate a floor warden on each floor to ensure proper response to emergency codes.
11. Ensure the fire alarm system is equipped with strobes and annunciators per established code.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

12. Have a floor warden identified and trained on each floor to respond to medical emergencies (e.g., CPR and use of the AED), while 911 is called.
13. Designate a safe area for a command center during an emergency.

14. Consider advising judges and staff by public address system, direct notification, telecommunications, email, or even bull-horn. One method of warning is the use of Court Building Warning Codes; a sample can be found in the Appendix.
15. Have an evacuation plan that everyone in the court building has been familiarized with.
16. Have a bomb-threat response protocol and lock-down, shelter-in-place, and evacuation plan in place.

**TOPIC C-3: INTERIOR ACCESS DURING BUSINESS HOURS
(CIRCULATION ZONES)**

Phase One

1. Establish the concept of circulation zones (separate, restricted, and secured areas and routes) for the following:
 - Judges and court staff (e.g., chambers, administration, jury deliberation rooms, conference rooms, staff-side of public counters, private elevators, secure stairways)
 - In-custody defendant transport (e.g., routes for entering and exiting the building, to and from holding areas/courtrooms)
 - Public (e.g., restrict the public to public zones)
2. All doors that are required to be locked, in accordance with the court buildings circulation zone concept, should be kept secured at all times. Such doors should never be left propped open and unsecured.
3. Have a key or access card system to control access based on a system approved by the administrative authority of who needs to have access to which areas. Cards or keys should be issued on the basis of need, not convenience. This system should
 - Be under the control of a central authority.
 - Require background checks for all card or key holders.
 - Include effective procedures for retrieving keys or canceling cards when situations change (e.g., employment termination).

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

4. Eliminate keys and require access cards. Maintenance staff and emergency responders should retain keys.
5. Establish door scopes (peepholes) to prevent non-authorized access through secured courtroom doors.
6. Improve definition and enforcement of public, restricted, and secured circulation zones.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

7. Establish some form of video recognition (intercom) system to allow access into secure areas.
8. Continue to improve definition and enforcement of circulation zones.
9. Install a CCTV camera system in all secure areas of the court building to monitor suspicious activities and inappropriate or threatening behaviors.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

10. Establish and maintain maximum separation among zones (e.g., in-custody defendants are not escorted through secure or public hallways; judges do not pass through public areas when going to and from their cars, through screening, and to and from chamber areas.)

TOPIC C-4: INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS

Phase One

1. All exterior doors should have basic intrusion alarm devices, covering
 - Building ingress/egress during business and after-hours.
 - Emergency exit doors during business and after-hours.

Phase Two

Continue the step in Phase One, plus add the following:

2. Install intrusion devices on all accessible windows, either glass-break or motion sensors.

Phase Three

Continue the steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

3. Establish a fully integrated intrusion system with the following functionalities:
 - When a court building is closed, every external door should be equipped with a device that will trigger an alarm at the control center of the appropriate responding agency and identify the intruded area.
 - During business hours, every door that is kept locked should be equipped with a device that will trigger an alarm that will identify the area intruded

at the command center within the building. Every locked door with an emergency exit bar should trigger an alarm whenever anyone uses it, with a ten-second delay consistent with local codes

- When the building is closed, this alarm should go to the control center of the appropriate responding law enforcement agency; when the building is open, the alarm should go to the building's command center.
- All windows that are reasonably accessible from the exterior perimeter of the building (e.g., first floor, basement, possibly second floor) should be protected against intrusion. This can be accomplished with a passive infrared motion detector (PIR) in each room (or combination of rooms) that has an accessible window or by attaching a motion sensor to each window.
- Intrusion detection alarm systems should sound at the site and at the command center.

Best Practice

Continue the steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

4. Integrate CCTV cameras into the system described above so that cameras will be activated in the area(s) of intrusion.

TOPIC C-5: JURORS

Phase One

1. Provide jurors with court security information before they report for duty by placing information on the jury summons they receive. For example:
 - Where to enter the court building.
 - What items (e.g., knives, nail files, scissors) may not be brought into the court building.
 - Not to discuss cases with anyone before and during jury service.
 - Not to wear juror ID badges outside the court building.
 - Who to contact regarding security and safety concerns or jury tampering.
2. Screen jurors as they enter the court building or before they report to the jury assembly area.
3. Give a basic security and building evacuation orientation and ID badge to jurors at the assembly area before going to the courtroom. Cover such matters as what to do in case of an emergency and how to respond to a coded emergency announcement. Instruct jurors to not wear or display the ID badge off-site; and whom to notify if it is missing or lost.
4. Assign a CSO to remain with the jury during the entire trial/deliberation.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

5. Assign a CSO to the jury room whenever juror payment is being made and when juror funds are obtained and transported back and forth to the court building.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

6. Assign a CSO to provide security inside and outside the jury assembly room when jurors are present.
7. Assign a CSO to escort jurors to and from the courtroom. If jurors who are serving on a jury trial are dining as a group outside the court building, a CSO should accompany them. If an elevator is used to transport jurors, one CSO should supervise the loading of jurors and another CSO should meet the jurors on the floor on which they disembark.
8. Develop specific policies and procedures for sequestered juries.

TOPIC C-6: PARKING (PARTICULARLY FOR JUDGES)

Phase One

1. Remove all signs in judges' parking area that identify parking spaces either by name or title of judge. Any signs should simply say reserved along with a number as appropriate.
2. Judges should notify law enforcement officials or a designated CSO of their arrival in the morning; and be offered an escort if they park in an unsecured parking area.
3. When departing for the day, if requested judges should be provided an escort to unsecured parking areas by designated CSOs.

Phase Two

Continue the steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

4. Fence-in the judges' parking lot and require that an electronic card access system is used for entrance into the court building. Install privacy slats if a chain-link fence is used.
5. During high-threat proceedings and heightened security concerns, judges and court staff should be escorted to their vehicles, and other modes of transportation. Ensure the judges parking area is equipped with appropriate security and safety lighting. Reference D-3 for additional lighting information.

Phase Three

Continue the steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

6. Provide secure parking for judges, court staff, and jurors.
7. Install CCTV cameras in secure parking lots.
8. Provide judges and court staff a regular CSO patrol presence in the parking areas in the morning, during the lunch hour, and at close of business.
9. Install passive and active security barriers to parking areas.

Best Practice

Continue the steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

10. Provide a secure parking area, preferably covered, for judges where they can proceed directly from their car, through screening, to their chambers without traversing any public areas or main court building entrance areas.

TOPIC C-7: PUBLIC COUNTERS AND OFFICES

Phase One

1. Install one or more duress alarms at each public counter. Train staff on the functionality of duress alarms and on the protocols for use.
2. Keep window coverings in offices (e.g., drapes, blinds) drawn to restrict observation from outside.
3. Install Plexiglas-type enclosures at cash counters.
4. Keep cash and checks in a secure, locked area overnight.
5. Ensure all counters are designed with adequate height and depth dimensions to discourage and limit attempts to jump or climb over.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

6. Install Plexiglas-type enclosures at all public counters.
7. Install duress alarms strategically in the back areas of offices.
8. Keep cash and checks and daily change locked in a safe overnight.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

9. Install CCTV cameras at the back of all public counters, to capture the faces of members of the public conducting business at the counter.
10. Install appropriate alarms and sensors (i.e. security, smoke, fire, extreme moisture, and motion) on safes.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

11. Install CCTV cameras overlooking the safe.
12. Provide regular security patrols by CSOs at the public counters.

Category D: Important

TOPIC D-1: CASH HANDLING

Phase One

1. Develop and train court staff on procedures for handling cash. The procedures should
 - Determine who should collect the money.
 - Determine how to safeguard money during the daytime work hours and overnight.
 - Train staff on how to verify checks and reconcile fees.
 - Determine and implement industry standards for deposits.
 - If employees are responsible for depositing funds, vary scheduled departure times and routes; and notify designated persons when departing for and completing the deposit.
2. Install protective barriers and duress alarms at cash counters.
3. Use an office safe for money storage.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

4. Install CCTV cameras at counters and in the office.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

5. Use an armored car service or the bank's personnel to pick up funds daily.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

6. Require two people – one court staff and an armed CSO – when carrying cash in and/or out of the court building.

TOPIC D-2: EXTERIOR/INTERIOR PATROLS

Phase One

1. Request that the local law enforcement agency conduct exterior patrols, particularly during times when the building is closed.
2. Develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with local law enforcement regarding which agency is responsible to protect the exterior of the court building during and after business hours.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

3. Conduct regular CSO interior patrols by CSOs assigned to work in the court building, focusing on crowded hallways.
4. Assign CSO exterior patrols both regularly and randomly throughout the day.

Phase Three

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

5. Continue to increase both interior and exterior CSO patrols of the court building.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

6. Require scheduled patrols of all interior and exterior areas 24/7, either by CSOs or local law enforcement officers.

TOPIC D-3: PERIMETER ISSUES

Phase One

1. Provide for sufficient lighting around the building perimeter, including parking areas. Lighting should be sufficient to provide a reasonable level of safety for judges and staff going to and from the court building during hours of darkness. It should also be sufficient for perimeter CCTV cameras to capture images.
2. Keep doors locked after hours and allow access only via appropriately authorized key or access cards.
3. Employ a sound crime prevention program through environmental design by properly maintaining landscaping, trees, and shrubs to limit areas of concealment and prevent property damage and undetected access
4. Conduct daily security checks around the perimeter.

Phase Two

Continue steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

5. Provide a secure parking area for judges with signs that do not indicate that the space is being used by a judge (e.g., signs should not say for official use only).
6. Install intrusion detection systems to cover all exterior doors and accessible windows.

Phase Three

Continue steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

7. Install CCTV cameras around the perimeter (at each corner of the court building).
8. Install bollards as required outside selected main entrance doors, shipping and delivery docks, over-sized ground floor windows, and other vulnerable or critical areas.
9. Enclose and secure all exposed utilities.

Best Practice

Continue steps in Phases One, Two, and Three, plus add the following:

10. Replace keys with an electronic card access system (except for back-up emergency) on exterior door entrances to the court building.
11. Provide secure parking for staff and jurors. Secure parking for judges and staff should have the following attributes:
 - Protected from public access
 - Protected from public view

- Required electronic access, by way of card or other appropriate device
- CCTV cameras in place and operating

TOPIC D-4: PUBLIC LOBBIES, HALLWAYS, STAIRWELLS, AND ELEVATORS

Phase One

1. Provide emergency lighting in the court building.
2. Establish egress/ingress standards regarding stairwells, hallways, and elevators. For most court facilities there should be no re-entry for persons exiting into stairwells. Entry from the stairwell-side should be controlled access only. For court buildings considered “hi-rise” facilities certain floors, as determined via security assessment, would allow re-entry.
3. Establish emergency procedure and evacuation diagrams.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

4. Designate secure and public elevators.
 - Provide secure elevator(s) for judges.
 - Provide secure elevator for prisoner transport.
5. Install appropriate signage to alert the public to what items cannot be brought into the court building (i.e., guns, knives, scissors) and that all persons are subject to search by security.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

6. Install CCTV cameras in lobbies, hallways, stairwells, and elevators in the court building and provide secure elevator(s) with electronic card access.
7. Assign a CSO to regularly patrol these areas in accordance with an assigned schedule.
8. Install a public address system in the building to facilitate announcements and emergency codes.

TOPIC D-5: SCREENING MAIL AND PACKAGES

Phase One

1. Provide routine visual inspection of all mail/packages coming into the court building, to include addressee verification and examination of suspicious items.

2. Require staff to attend training on postal security, recognition points, and package identification techniques as provided by the United States Postal Service (USPS).
3. Develop and practice a response protocol with law enforcement when a package is identified as suspicious or dangerous.
4. Develop specific policies and procedures to confirm mail/package senders and recipients; and whether the mail/package has been tampered with.

Phase Two

Continue all steps in Phase One, plus add the following:

5. Require all mail and packages to be processed through an x-ray imaging system.
6. Require everyone delivering mail or packages to pass through the magnetometer.

Best Practice

Continue all steps in Phases One and Two, plus add the following:

7. Best practice is to establish a single and separate offsite screening station or location for all mail and packages delivered to the court building. It may not be feasible for smaller courts to have an offsite location dedicated exclusively to its use. Smaller courts may work with the USPS, county, or other local officials to find shared offsite space for this purpose. Best practices for operating the mailroom for larger courts include the following:
 - All mail, packages, and parcels from USPS, FedEx, UPS, DHL, and other carriers should be thoroughly screened (x-ray and explosive trace detector, if suspicious) upon being received at the mailroom. This includes all USPS mail delivered and picked up by court staff from the local post office.
 - Deliveries of flowers, candy, food, gifts, etc., to any person located in a court building should be cleared through the mailroom first, be verified and vouched for by the recipient, screened as appropriate, and then delivered.
 - Mailroom staff should sort incoming mail and packages off site by building, division, and/or department and prepare them for acceptance by designated representatives of each court office or division.
 - Designated representatives of each court office or division should go to the mailroom, pick up mail for distribution to their offices, and identify questionable items. All authorized court and other staff mail handlers should attend training on handling suspicious mail. Local USPS or postal inspectors may conduct advanced training for state and local government agencies.

RESEARCH-BASED PRACTICES TO INCREASE RESPONSE RATES FOR WEB SURVEYS

Surveys are one of a number of means to gather data. Web-based surveys can present something of a problem. While they are easy to make and distribute, survey response is typically weak. However, research demonstrates adherence to research-based “best practices” increases the response rate for web-based survey. Those shown to make a significant difference in response rates include:

- Ensuring the sample frame includes likely stakeholders
- Increasing the number of contacts with participants; Creating Multiple contact opportunities with participants
- Crafting a survey that only includes questions germane to the actual topic
- Crafting invitation messages with skill, taking into consideration the trustworthiness of the sender
- Personalizing invitations/messages.

REFINING THE SAMPLE FRAME

Response rates increase as respondents' *affinity* to the message increases – meaning ask questions of people who have information, interest in topic, and are most likely to be affected by the issue under investigation.

PREPARE MULTIPLE CONTACTS

It is recommended there be a *pre-survey notification*, a *link to the survey*, and *reminder messages*. Pre-survey notifications work well when they “alert” the recipient of the coming survey. The survey link should be sent within 24 hours of the alert message. There should be three reminders – 3 days post survey message, again 5 days later, and a final reminder one week after the second.

CAREFULLY CREATING SURVEY

Survey must be *salient* and *not impose too much on participant's time*. Navigation must not frustrate user – drafts and sample testing are important. If demographic information can be gathered in another manner do not include in survey.

ESTABLISHING MESSAGE TRUSTWORTHINESS

Use email address with courts.az.gov domain name. If possible create a prefix for email address that has acronym of oversight agency. Use a final sentence in message indicating approved by Chief Justice or AOC. Consider an inside facing webpage providing information about the survey linked from the email with the survey.

CREATE PERSONALIZED MESSAGES

Use name and, if possible, position/title of recipient, often possible through a merge feature.

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Tuesday, February 22, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, 1501 W. Washington – Conference Room 119 A/B

Conference Call: 602-452-3288 Access Code: 8945

[WebEx Link](#) [CSSC Homepage](#)

AGENDA

- 10:00 a.m. Call to Order/ Welcome and Introductions *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- 10:05 a.m. Approval of Minutes – January 12, 2016 meeting; *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
 Formal Action/Request
- 10:10 a.m. Rules of Business/Proxy Form *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
 Formal Action/Request
- 10:15 a.m. Web-Based Survey Best Practices *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
Jennifer Albright, Staff
- 10:30 a.m. Review of Draft Survey Questions *All*
- Scope and depth of survey
 - The survey questions
 - Target survey audience
 - Other ideas/discussion

11:30 Lunch

- 12:00 p.m. Breakout: Small Working Group Discussions on policy development *All*
- Courthouse Security (*Rolf Eckel*)
 - Courtroom Security (*Honorable Kyle Bryson*)
 - Courthouse Perimeter Security (*John F. Phelps*)
 - Court Security Training (*Faye Guertin*)
- 1:30 p.m. Small Group Report Back *All*
- 1:55 p.m. Announcements/Call to the Public *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- Adjournment *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*

Next Meeting: March 22, 2016 - 10:00 a.m.
Arizona State Courts Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

All times are approximate. The Chair reserves the right to set the order of the agenda. For any item on the agenda, the Committee may vote to go into executive session as permitted by Arizona Code of Judicial Administration § 1-202. Please contact Jennifer Albright, staff to the Court Security Standards Committee, at (602) 452-3453, with any questions concerning this agenda. Persons with a disability may request a reasonable accommodation, such as auxiliary aids or materials in alternative formats, by contacting Sabrina Nash at (602) 452-3849. Requests should be made as early as possible to allow time to arrange for the accommodation.

Court Security Standards Committee (CSSC)

DRAFT MINUTES

January 12, 2016

10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Conference Room 119 A/B

1501 West Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Present: Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Mary Jane Abril, Greg DeMerritt, Sheriff Scott Mascher, Commander Scott Slade, Richard Colwell, Robert Hughes, Judge Kyle Bryson, Tina Mattison, Keith Kaplan, John Phelps, Sheriff William Pribil, Faye Guertin, Judge Robert Krombeen, Joshua Halversen, Rolf Eckel.

Presenters/Guests: Timm Fautsko, National Center for State Courts (NCSC)

Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) Attendees: Dave Byers, Mike Baumstark

Staff: Jennifer Albright (AOC), Sabrina Nash (AOC), Theresa Barrett (AOC)

Call to Order/Welcome and Introductions

With a quorum present, the January 12, 2016, meeting of CSSC was called to order at 10:00 a.m. by Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair. Mr. Reinkensmeyer introduced Timm Faustko from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC), who will be working with the committee to meet the goals of the administrative order. Committee members then introduced themselves and provided a brief bio. Mr. Reinkensmeyer then asked Theresa Barrett, Mike Baumstark and Dave Byers to introduce themselves.

Mr. Byers addressed committee members regarding the direction of court security and outlined some of the challenges facing the committee, such as creating standards that are applicable to both rural and urban courts, whether there should be guidelines or standards, and the manner of funding any increased security measure. He also discussed issues of armed versus unarmed security, bomb threats, and the creation of a lawyer bypass program to help expedite lawyers who move from courthouse to courthouse, as well as the certification and training of court security staff.

Review of AO 2015-104

Marcus Reinkensmeyer summarized the scope of work for the committee as outlined in the Administration Order:

- Develop and conduct a survey on court security provisions
- Develop recommendations on standards for courthouse and courtroom security and officer training
- Submit a final report by September 30, 2016

- Report recommendations to the Arizona Judicial Council (AJC) by the AJC's October 2016 meeting

Status of Court Security in the USA

Timm Fautsko, NCSC, spoke about several recent security incidents in courts throughout the country. He suggested that in planning court security these questions should be considered:

- Who is coming into the courthouse?
- How are they getting in (entryway points)?
- What is being brought into the courthouse?
- Keep track of contraband brought into the courthouse, as this information could be useful in planning trainings and could help with funding requests.
- Keep track of incidents to share with court security, and use this information in training staff to increase security awareness.

Mr. Fautsko shared statistics from a recent national survey: security measures that courts did and did not have; targeted acts of violence; and reported issues impacting court security such as scare funding, lack of training, and need for additional staff. Mr. Fautsko encouraged the committee to work towards court security standards that would be easily achievable by both metropolitan and rural courts, and to have security manuals that are succinct. He stated that communication, collaboration, and training (including security drills) are the best tools to increase court security.

Questions were raised during Mr. Fautsko's presentation including:

- Should court officers, law enforcement, and judges should be armed while in the courthouse.
- How to handle the possibility violence will be perpetuated by an employee and not someone coming into court as a litigant or as a member of the public.

Review of Publications & Materials

Marcus Reinkensmeyer deferred the review of publications to committee members' discretion and had Ms. Jennifer Albright show members how to navigate the Court Security Standards Committee webpage. Ms. Albright demonstrated how to access the information and materials made available through the website.

Discussion: Benchmarking Security Standards

What Other States Do/NCSC Best Practices/What Do We Want to Do

Timm Fautsko explained the best practices for keeping courts safe is collaboration and communication. He stated that the most successful and safe court systems in this country have a security team comprised of the presiding judge, court administrator, clerk, court security – whether employed by court or provided by local law enforcement, and often other stakeholders that work together to develop, test, and improve court security policies and protocols. He also presented information on three categories of security measure and their relative importance to overall security. Mr. Fautsko then opened the floor for discussion on what the committee wants to do. Suggestions from the committee were:

- Developing standards that would be adaptable from urban to rural courts
- Creating procedural guidance for court staff on how to deal with irate visitors to the court

- Assessing the culture of the each court and that particular court's security needs
- Requiring each court to have an active security committee
- Creating tiered security guidelines that courts could use to build up security over time
- Address the increased risk specialty courts (Mental Health, Drug and Veterans Court) bring to the courthouse.
- Develop a list of questions to survey the courts on current measures and concerns; then develop guidelines based on what the courts perceive to be the greatest need.
- Create a baseline of standard training for courts that can be expanded as resources need or in proportion to the needs of the court.
- Develop funding strategies, such as: ask legislature for funding or increase/add fees to support court security? Earmark enhancement funds?

Web-Based Survey Best Practices

Marcus Reinkensmeyer and Timm Fautsko, presented research based practices to get good results from a web-based survey. These some of the practices include:

- Be succinct and specific with your questions
- Multiple choice or yes/no questions work best
- Consider your audience and possibly have two sets of questions: what do they have, what do they need?

The projected timeline for the web-based survey is to have a rough draft for review at the February 22, 2016 meeting, and after review and revision send the survey in March 2016.

Breakout: Small Working Group Discussions

The committee went into small workgroups to develop suggested topics for a survey on court security in the state. The groups were divided as follows:

Courthouse Security (Rolf Eckel)

Keith Kaplan, Joshua Halversen, Richard Colwell

Courtroom Security (Honorable Kyle Bryson)

Sheriff Mascher, Judge Krombeen, Tina Mattison

Courthouse Perimeter Security (John F. Phelps)

Sheriff Pribil, Greg DeMerritt

Court Security Training (Faye Guertin)

Robert Hughes, Sheriff Slade, Mary Jane Abril

Small Group Report Back

A spokesperson for each workgroup reported back to the committee a list of items discussed. The list included:

Courthouse Security:

Determine what security measure each court has?

Segregate by court type urban versus rural.

What do the people who work in and frequent the court feel are most important security measures?

Does each court have an active security committee?

Courtroom Security:

Courtroom populations - protocol for attorneys/judges/staff to notify court of a potentially volatile client, witness or litigant
Entrances into the courtroom - seating in the gallery; decorum orders
Exit or escape routes - rally points and designated contact person for communications
Duress/Incident alerts and reporting
Securing and locking of courtroom
Juror access - control for egress and ingress
In custody defendants: circulation patterns, location in courtroom
Armed personnel in courtroom

Courthouse Perimeter Security:

Definition of perimeter
Identification of threats from perimeter
Number of doors and windows; alarmed doors and windows
Line of sight; cameras or other manner of observing
Controlled access for vendors

Court Security Training:

When are employees trained on security measures
What is provided in training; How often is training
Court Security Officer Academy; what specific training do court security personnel receive
Mandatory defense tactics for armed security
Mental Health Training for all employees; de-escalation and defensive tactics
Use of force standards for court security personnel
Protocols for evacuation, lockdown, active shooter, other emergencies

Good of the Order/Call to the Public

There was no response to the call to the public.
Marcus Reinkensmeyer thanked committee members for their participation in this committee.

Next Committee Meeting Date

Monday, February 22, 2016
10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
Arizona State Courts Building, Conference Room 119 A/B
1501 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Adjourned at 1:57 p.m.

Option A

DRAFT – February 19, 2015

COURT BUILDING SECURITY SURVEY

In an effort to improve safety and security in every court building in this state, the Arizona Judicial Branch is in the process of developing standards and guidelines for court security. Standards are those security measures that would be required to be in place in every court building; guidelines are those security measures that would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

As an important step in this process, we are conducting this survey to discover three things: 1) what is currently in place in the way of security measures; 2) how well those measures are working; and 3) what you believe are the most important measures to have in place in your court building.

We will be grateful if you will fill out this survey and submit your answers by April XX.

Thank you,

Chief Justice Scott Bales

David Byers, State Court Administrator

Note: If you have responsibility for multiple court building locations, please answer this survey for the location at which you spend the most of our time working.

1. Position Title

- Judge
- Other judicial officer (e.g., hearing officer, commissioner)
- Judicial support staff
- Courtroom support staff
- Clerk's office staff
- Court administrator
- Other court staff
- Sheriff deputy
- Police officer
- Court security officer (non-sheriff deputy or police officer)
- Employee of another agency sharing building with court

2. Location

County _____

City _____

3. Type of Court Building

- Single use (court only)
- Multiple use (shared with other agency/entity)

4. Court Type

- Appellate court
- Superior court
- Justice of the peace court

5. Who provides security for your court building:

- Court-employed security officers
- Sheriff's office
- Police department
- Private security company

A: Perimeter of the Court Building

6. Do you have the following security measures around the **perimeter of your Court Building?**

	Yes	No	Don't know
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	0	0	0
Security cameras located around perimeter	0	0	0
Alarmed entrances and exits	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	0	0	0

7. How well do you think the following security measures currently work around the **perimeter of your Court Building?**

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	N/A
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	0	0	0	0	0
Security cameras located around perimeter	0	0	0	0	0
Alarmed entrances and exits	0	0	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	0	0	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	0	0	0	0	0

8. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place around the **perimeter of your Court Building?**

	1 <i>(Extremely important)</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7 <i>(Not very important)</i>
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras located around perimeter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alarmed entrances and exits	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

B: In the Court Building

9. Do you have the following security measures in your **Court Building?**

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command and control room	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public includes (check all that apply): <input type="radio"/> Magnetometer <input type="radio"/> X-ray machine <input type="radio"/> Hand wand <input type="radio"/> N/A			
Entry-way weapons screening for employees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees includes (check all that apply): <input type="radio"/> Magnetometer <input type="radio"/> X-ray machine <input type="radio"/> Hand wand <input type="radio"/> N/A			
Entry-way weapons screening for judges/ judicial officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for judicial officers includes (check all that apply): <input type="radio"/> Magnetometer <input type="radio"/> X-ray machine <input type="radio"/> Hand wand <input type="radio"/> N/A			
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Security for after-hour access	0	0	0				
10. How well do you think the following security measures currently work in your <u>Court Building</u>?							
	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	N/A	Don't know	
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Security command and control room	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Security policies and procedures							
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Entry-way weapons screening for employees	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Entry-way weapons screening for judges/judicial officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Security for after-hour access	0	0	0	0	0	0	
11. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place in your <u>Court Building</u>?							
	1 <i>(Extremely important)</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7 <i>(Not very important)</i>
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security command and control room	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security policies and procedures	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Entry-way weapons screening for employees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Entry-way weapons screening for judges/judicial officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security for after-hour access	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

C: Courtroom

12. Do you have the following security measures for your **courtroom**?

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Security officers present at <u>all</u> courtroom proceedings	0	0	0
Duress alarms on bench	0	0	0
Duress alarms at clerk's station	0	0	0
Protocols for seating assignments	0	0	0
Increased security for high profile cases	0	0	0
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody defendants	0	0	0
Decorum instructions/orders	0	0	0
Rules re: firearms in courtroom	0	0	0
Rules re: cell phones/cameras in courtroom	0	0	0
Designated exits/escape routes	0	0	0
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	0	0	0
Lock-down capability	0	0	0
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	0	0	0
Security cameras in courtrooms	0	0	0
Duress alarms in chambers	0	0	0
Secured jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0
Duress alarms in jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0

13. How well do you think the following security measures currently work for your **courtroom**?

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	N/A	Don't know
Security officers present at <u>all</u> courtroom proceedings	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms on bench	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms at clerk's station	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protocols for seating assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0
Increased security for high profile cases	0	0	0	0	0	0
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody defendants	0	0	0	0	0	0
Decorum instructions/orders	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rules re: firearms in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rules re: cell phones/cameras in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0
Designated exits/escape routes	0	0	0	0	0	0
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lock-down capability	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security cameras in courtrooms	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms in chambers	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secured jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms in jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0	0	0	0

14. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place for your **courtroom**?

	1 (Extremely important)	2	3	4	5	6	7 (Not very important)
Security officers present at <u>all</u> courtroom proceedings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Duress alarms on bench	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms at clerk's station	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protocols for seating assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Increased security for high profile cases	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody defendants	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Decorum instructions/orders	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rules re: firearms in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rules re: cell phones/cameras in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Designated exits/escape routes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lock-down capability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security cameras in courtrooms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms in chambers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secured jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms in jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

D: Training

15. Have you been trained since January 2015 on the following topics/areas?

	<i>Yes</i>	No	Don't know
Written policies and procedures for court security	0	0	0
Security training as part of annual training requirements	0	0	0

Threats against judges/judicial officers	0	0	0
Shooter in place	0	0	0
Hostage taking	0	0	0
Communications telephone tree	0	0	0
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	0	0	0
Items prohibited from the court building	0	0	0
Incidents/incident- reporting	0	0	0
Safety at home/to and from work	0	0	0
Mental health identification	0	0	0
De-escalation tactics	0	0	0
CPR/AED/first aid	0	0	0
Suspicious package	0	0	0

16. How effective do you think the trainings in the following areas have been in your court building?

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	N/A	Don't know
Written policies and procedures for court security	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security training as part of annual training requirements	0	0	0	0	0	0
Threats against judges/judicial officers	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shooter in place	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hostage taking	0	0	0	0	0	0
Communications telephone tree	0	0	0	0	0	0
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	0	0	0	0	0	0
Items prohibited from the court building	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incidents/incident- reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safety at home/to and from work	0	0	0	0	0	0

Mental health identification	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
De-escalation tactics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CPR/AED/first aid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suspicious package	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17. How important do you think it is to have training in the following areas?							
	1 <i>(Extremely important)</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7 <i>(Not very important)</i>
Written policies and procedures for court security	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security training as part of annual training requirements	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
For (check all that apply):	<input type="checkbox"/> Judges	<input type="checkbox"/> Court staff	<input type="checkbox"/> Deputies/security officers	<input type="checkbox"/> N/A			
Threats against judges/judicial officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shooter in place	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hostage taking	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Communications telephone tree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Items prohibited from the court building	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incidents/incident- reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safety at home/to and from work	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mental health identification	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
De-escalation tactics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CPR/AED/first aid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suspicious package	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

18. How important do you think it is to have security standards and guidelines in every court building? *Standards* are those security measures that are readily achievable and would be required to be in place in every court building. *Guidelines* are those security measures that may take longer to achieve and would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

	1 (Extremely important)	2	3	4	5	6	7 (Not very important)
Security standards	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security guidelines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

19. What do you think is a reasonable time frame (in number of years) for implementing security standards and guidelines?

	1	2	3	4	5
Security standards	0	0	0	0	0
Security guidelines	0	0	0	0	0

20a When was the last time you had a practice evacuation of your court building (e.g., fire drill)?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't remember the last time

20b. When was the last time you had an evacuation of your court building because of an actual emergency?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't remember the last time

Option B

DRAFT – February 19, 2015

COURT BUILDING SECURITY SURVEY

In an effort to improve safety and security in every court building in this state, the Arizona Judicial Branch is in the process of developing standards and guidelines for court security. Standards are those security measures that would be required to be in place in every court building; guidelines are those security measures that would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

As an important step in this process, we are conducting this survey to discover three things: 1) what is currently in place in the way of security measures; 2) how well those measures are working; and 3) what you believe are the most important measures to have in place in your court building.

We will be grateful if you will fill out this survey and submit your answers by April XX.

Thank you,

Chief Justice Scott Bales

David Byers, State Court Administrator

Note: If you have responsibility for multiple court building locations, please answer this survey for the location at which you spend the most of our time working.

1. Position Title

- Judge
- Other judicial officer (e.g., hearing officer, commissioner)
- Judicial support staff
- Courtroom support staff
- Clerk’s office staff
- Court administrator
- Other court staff
- Sheriff deputy
- Police officer
- Court security officer (non-sheriff deputy or police officer)
- Employee of another agency sharing building with court

2. Location

County _____

City _____

3. Type of Court Building

- Single use (court only)
- Multiple use (shared with other agency/entity)

4. Court Type

- Appellate court
- Superior court
- Justice of the peace court

5. Who provides security for your court building:

- Court-employed security officers
- Sheriff's office
- Police department
- Private security company

A: Perimeter of the Court Building

6. Do you have the following security measures around the **perimeter of your Court Building?**

	Yes	No	Don't know
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	0	0	0
Security cameras located around perimeter	0	0	0
Alarmed entrances and exits	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	0	0	0

7. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place around the **perimeter of your Court Building?**

	1 (Extremely important)	2	3	4	5	6	7 (Not very important)
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security cameras located around perimeter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alarmed entrances and exits	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

B: In the Court Building

8. Do you have the following security measures in your **Court Building?**

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command and control room	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public includes (check all that apply):			
<input type="radio"/> Magnetometer	<input type="radio"/> X-ray machine	<input type="radio"/> Hand wand	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Entry-way weapons screening for employees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees includes (check all that apply):			
<input type="radio"/> Magnetometer	<input type="radio"/> X-ray machine	<input type="radio"/> Hand wand	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Entry-way weapons screening for judges/ judicial officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for judicial officers includes (check all that apply):			
<input type="radio"/> Magnetometer	<input type="radio"/> X-ray machine	<input type="radio"/> Hand wand	<input type="radio"/> N/A
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security for after-hour access	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

9. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place in your **Court Building?**

	1 <i>(Extremely important)</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7 <i>(Not very important)</i>
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command and control room	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Entry-way weapons screening for employees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Entry-way weapons screening for judges/judicial officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security for after-hour access	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

C: Courtroom

10. Do you have the following security measures for your **courtroom**?

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Security officers present at <u>all</u> courtroom proceedings	0	0	0
Duress alarms on bench	0	0	0
Duress alarms at clerk's station	0	0	0
Protocols for seating assignments	0	0	0
Increased security for high profile cases	0	0	0
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody defendants	0	0	0
Decorum instructions/orders	0	0	0
Rules re: firearms in courtroom	0	0	0
Rules re: cell phones/cameras in courtroom	0	0	0
Designated exits/escape routes	0	0	0
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	0	0	0
Lock-down capability	0	0	0
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	0	0	0
Security cameras in courtrooms	0	0	0

Duress alarms in chambers	0	0	0				
Secured jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0				
Duress alarms in jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0				
11. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place for your <u>courtroom</u>?							
	1 <i>(Extremely important)</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7 <i>(Not very important)</i>
Security officers present at <u>all</u> courtroom proceedings	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms on bench	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms at clerk's station	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Protocols for seating assignments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Increased security for high profile cases	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody defendants	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Decorum instructions/orders	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rules re: firearms in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rules re: cell phones/cameras in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Designated exits/escape routes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lock-down capability	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security cameras in courtrooms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms in chambers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Secured jury deliberation rooms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Duress alarms in jury deliberation	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

rooms

D: Training

12. Have you been trained since January 2015 on the following topics/areas?

	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Don't know</i>
Written policies and procedures for court security	0	0	0
Security training as part of annual training requirements	0	0	0
Threats against judges/judicial officers	0	0	0
Shooter in place	0	0	0
Hostage taking	0	0	0
Communications telephone tree	0	0	0
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	0	0	0
Items prohibited from the court building	0	0	0
Incidents/incident- reporting	0	0	0
Safety at home/to and from work	0	0	0
Mental health identification	0	0	0
De-escalation tactics	0	0	0
CPR/AED/first aid	0	0	0
Suspicious package	0	0	0

13. How important do you think it is to have training in the following areas?

	1 <i>(Extremely important)</i>	2	3	4	5	6	7 <i>(Not very important)</i>
Written policies and procedures for court security	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security training as part of annual training requirements	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

For (check all that apply): Judges Court staff Deputies/security officers N/A

Threats against judges/judicial officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Shooter in place	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hostage taking	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Communications telephone tree	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Items prohibited from the court building	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Incidents/incident- reporting	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Safety at home/to and from work	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mental health identification	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
De-escalation tactics	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CPR/AED/first aid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Suspicious package	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

14. How important do you think it is to have security standards and guidelines in every court building? *Standards* are those security measures that are readily achievable and would be required to be in place in every court building. *Guidelines* are those security measures that may take longer to achieve and would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

	1 (Extremely important)	2	3	4	5	6	7 (Not very important)
Security standards	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Security guidelines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

15. What do you think is a reasonable time frame (in number of years) for implementing security standards and guidelines?

	1	2	3	4	5
Security standards	0	0	0	0	0
Security guidelines	0	0	0	0	0

16 When was the last time you had a practice evacuation of your court building (e.g., fire drill)?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't remember the last time

17. When was the last time you had an evacuation of your court building because of an actual emergency?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't remember the last time

National Center for State Courts

NCSC consultants recommend that the following topics be considered for inclusion among the web survey questions. These topics are important issues that are covered in the NCSC's Steps to Best Practices

To Consider adding to list of questions re. the perimeter of the court building:

Adequate lighting around the perimeter

Bollards to protect against vehicular assault

Containers (e.g. newspaper kiosks) too close to the court building

Exposed utilities

Posted sign saying no guns allowed in court building

To Consider adding to list of questions re. in the court building:

Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband

Duress alarms at public transaction counters

Security cameras at public transaction counters

Protective covering (e.g. Plexiglas) at public transaction counters

Interior doors to secure areas are kept properly locked

Security cameras in hallways and lobbies

Screening mail and packages

Emergency equipment (e.g. fire alarms, AEDs)

Secured doors separating areas for judges and employees from public areas

Judges' chambers can be locked from the inside.

To Consider adding to list of questions re. the courtroom:

Regular “sweeps” of courtrooms

Keeping courtroom doors locked when courtroom not in use.

Window coverings to prevent views from outside (particular in chambers)

To Consider adding to list of questions re. Training:

Cybersecurity

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Tuesday, March 22, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, 1501 W. Washington – Conference Room 119 A/B

Conference Call: 602-452-3288 Access Code: 4839

[WebEx Link](#) [CSSC Homepage](#)

AGENDA

- 10:00 a.m. Call to Order/ Welcome and Introductions *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- 10:05 a.m. Approval of Minutes, February 22, 2016, meeting *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
 Formal Action/Request
- 10:10 a.m. Review of Draft Survey and Testing Results *All*
- 11:15 a.m. Discussion of Survey Audience and Distribution *All*
-
- 11:45 Lunch**
-
- 12:15 p.m. Standards versus Guidelines *Timm Fautsko, NCSC*
- 12:45 p.m. Small Group Discussions: Review of Framework of Standards and Guidelines Document *All*
 - Scope
 - Depth
- 1:45 p.m. Small Group Report Back *All*
- 1:55 p.m. Announcements/Call to the Public *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- 2:00 p.m. Adjournment *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*

Next Meetings: April 29, 2016 - 10:00 a.m.

May 24, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

All times are approximate. The Chair reserves the right to set the order of the agenda. For any item on the agenda, the Committee may vote to go into executive session as permitted by Arizona Code of Judicial Administration § 1-202. Please contact Jennifer Albright, staff to the Court Security Standards Committee, at (602) 452-3453, with any questions concerning this agenda. Persons with a disability may request a reasonable accommodation, such as auxiliary aids or materials in alternative formats, by contacting Sabrina Nash at (602) 452-3849. Requests should be made as early as possible to allow time to arrange for the accommodation.

Court Security Standards Committee (CSSC)

DRAFT MINUTES

February 22, 2016

10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Conference Room 119 A/B

1501 West Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Present: Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Mary Jane Abril, Judge Kyle Bryson, Richard Colwell, Greg DeMerritt, Rolf Eckel, Faye Guertin, Robert Hughes, Keith Kaplan, Judge Robert Krombeen, Earle Lloyd (proxy for Commander Scott Slade), Sheriff Scott Mascher, Tina Mattison, John Phelps, Sheriff William Pribil

Absent: Robert Hughes, Joshua Halversen

Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) Guests: Theresa Barrett, Jeff Schrade

AOC Staff: Jennifer Albright, Sabrina Nash

Call to Order/Welcome and Introductions

Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair, called the meeting to order at 10:02 a.m. and asked Committee members to introduce themselves to each other for the benefit of members on the phone. After introductions were made, Mr. Reinkensmeyer shared a few interesting news items related to court security around the country. Highlights included:

- **Rogers County, Oklahoma** –A ten dollar fee per civil case to help with the cost of security and screening, authorized by statute, was approved. The fee will provide funding for improved and increased court security.
- **Harris County, Texas** –A new law was recently passed allowing the public to carry concealed weapons into most county offices, i.e. County Assessor, Treasurer, and the Board of Supervisors, but not the court. All of these offices share the same building. The passing of this law necessitated changes in where court security checkpoints were located – removing from the main entrance and moving to areas closer to location of courtrooms, the installation of more panic buttons and better communication with the Sheriff’s Office.
- **Calhoun County, Florida** – A judge was recently threatened and because court is held in a shared facility, the other tenants in the building did not want to inconvenience their visitors by screening all visitors to the building. Screening was instituted outside the courtroom to meet the concerns regarding screening persons not in the building for court business.

Approval of Minutes from January 12, 2016

Motion: Mr. Phelps moved to approve the January 12, 2016, minutes as presented. **Seconded:** Judge Bryson **Vote:** Unanimous.

Rules of Business/Proxy Form

Marcus Reinkensmeyer explained the purpose of the proxy form is to allow committee members to designate a proxy to represent them at meetings they themselves cannot attend due to scheduling conflicts. The proxy form identifies in writing who will be attending in the members absence and the duties and authority associated with the role of proxy.

Motion: Judge Bryson moved to approve the proxy form. **Seconded:** Mr. Phelps **Vote:** Unanimous.

Web-Based Survey Best Practices

Jennifer Albright, Senior Policy Analyst, AOC, talked about best practices for web-based surveys. Things to consider are:

- Audience - Stakeholders are more likely to respond when they have a vested interest in the subject of the survey and the results. Identify audience.
- Content - Development of questions to get desired information; keep the survey from being too long and time consuming for respondents.
- Consistency - Use consistent language in both the survey and message to stakeholders.
- Goal - For the Committee, the goal is to evaluate what courts have and what they need. Questions should be specific to that goal.
- Organization - Questions should be organized in a manner that is easy to follow and logical.

Review of Draft Survey Questions

Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair, asked the committee if they thought the survey should go out to stakeholders via a message from the Committee or the Chief Justice. It was suggested by judges on the Committee that the survey should come from the Chief Justice. Mr. Reinkensmeyer then asked committee members to review the sample surveys and provide input. Discussion ensued with suggestions as follows:

- **Survey Introduction** - Question 1 - add "other" to position title and ask respondent to identify their position. Question 4 - add municipal court to the list of court types. Questions 1 and 5 - change the list of various law enforcement agencies to be law enforcement officer (LEO), to cover them all. It was suggested the survey ask respondents to designate if they are in-house court staff, transport staff, or probation officer. Question 5 - Add "no security" to the list of options.
- **Perimeter of the Court Building** - add an open comment box at the end of each survey question, add questions related to the first four items listed in the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) recommended additional topics.
- **In the Court Building** - change the word magnetometer to metal detector, change security command/control room to security command/control area, add monitoring of security cameras and duress alarms, secured interior doors, and the first four items in the NCSC list of recommended additional topics.
- **Courtroom** - add courtroom protocol on firearms and cellphones in the courtroom, questions regarding lock down policy/procedure, shelter in place, facility orientation and training for key responders, first responder knowledge of building layout, locked courtroom doors, and sweeps of courtrooms. It was suggested that the survey group duress alarm questions in a single question.

- **Training** – add questions regarding how often training is received, whether use of force training is provided, staff training on building evacuation, active shooter and internal communication during emergency.

Discussion then concluded with comments regarding prospective survey participants and how best to distribute the survey to those participants.

Breakout: Small Working Group Discussions on policy development

The Committee went into small workgroups to discuss policy development for court security related to their work group topic areas. Mr. Reinkensmeyer asked the committee to consider policies that would be designated as standards versus policies better suited for guidelines. The Committee was also asked to consider policies that are known best practices for court security. The workgroups were divided as follows:

- Courthouse Security
- Courtroom Security
- Courthouse Perimeter Security
- Court Security Training

Small Group Report Back

The spokesperson for each workgroup reported back to the Committee their thoughts. Highlights included:

- **Courthouse Security Workgroup** – This workgroup discussed how to differentiate between large and small courts and the role court size plays in making recommendations for court security guidelines and standards. The workgroup reported that standards for all courts should include: a security committee, a policy or procedure manual, and an annual security checklist. It discussed the possibility of assessing a court security fee to be used to purchase security equipment and fund training for courts. Guidelines for smaller courts included replacing glass with ballistic glass, locking doors, conducting random employee screenings, separating in-custody defendants from judges and the general public, and screening packages. Guidelines for larger courts included the additional items of screening all public visitors entering the courthouse, adding duress alarms and cameras, monitoring of duress alarms and cameras, and armed security officers.
- **Courtroom Security Workgroup** – This workgroup discussed increasing security awareness, duress alarms and testing with staff and the bench, courtroom evacuation, establishing of courtroom decorum orders, ballistic resistance material for the bench, courtroom assessment for improvised weapons, and locking courtroom doors to shelter in place.
- **Courthouse Perimeter Security Workgroup** – This workgroup also discussed differentiating between large and small courts, as well as creating a security checklist specific to the perimeter or defining the perimeter and reviewing it annually, instituting perimeter sweeps, and creating a way to identify high profile cases that may require heightened security measures. This workgroup indicated it considered security threats that were most probable versus least probable in its discussion of whether a measure should be a standard or a guideline.
- **Court Security Training Workgroup** – This workgroup debated mandatory training for rural courts versus metropolitan courts. They also discussed the pros and cons of armed versus unarmed security personnel; the need for training to be reviewed

annually; when training should occur; mandatory security orientation for judges, security officers and court staff; the possibility of traveling security trainers and train-the-trainer approaches to help with training; annual re-training of security personnel on x-ray machines, hand wands and metal detectors; and the mandatory screening for all armed personnel including background checks, drug screening, and psychological evaluations.

Good of the Order/Call to the Public

Jennifer Albright outlined the process for updating the survey based on comments received from committee members. Once the survey is updated, she will send it to a sample group of respondents that will include the Committee members, for feedback.

Ms. Albright will also send out an email to committee members regarding meeting dates in April and May.

Next Committee Meeting Date:

Tuesday, March 22, 2016

10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Arizona State Court Building, Conference Room 119

1501 West Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Adjourned at 2:01 p.m.

Arizona Court Building Security Survey

FOR TESTING PURPOSES ONLY - NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION



In an effort to improve safety and security in every state court building, the Administrative Office of Courts, Court Security Standards Committee, is in the process of developing standards and guidelines for court security. Standards are those security measures that would be required to be in place in every court building; guidelines are those security measures that would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

As an important step in this process, we are conducting this survey to discover three things: 1) what is currently in place in the way of security measures; 2) how well those measures are working; and 3) what you believe are the most important measures to have in place in your court building.

Please complete this survey and submit your answers by April XX, 2016.

Thank you,

Chief Justice Scott Bales
David Byers, Director, Administrative Office of Courts

Note: If you have responsibility for multiple court building locations, please answer this survey for the location at which you spend the most of your time working.

(**May need to specify that users should access the survey on a computer, not on a cell phone or mobile device, or they may experience input issues**)

* 1. Position Title

- Judge
- Other judicial officer (e.g., hearing officer, commissioner)
- Judicial support staff
- Courtroom support staff
- Clerk's office staff
- Court administrator
- Other court staff
- Law enforcement officer
- Employee of another agency sharing building with court
- Other (please specify)

* 2. Location, County (**Dropdown menu will be added**)

* 3. City (**Dropdown menu will be added**)

* 4. Type of court building

- Single use (court only)
- Multiple use (shared with other agency/entity)

* 5. Court Type

- Appellate court
- Superior court
- Justice of the peace court

* 6. Who provides security for your court building (mark all that apply)?

Court-employed security officers

Sheriff's office

Police department

Private security company

No security

Other (please specify)

Arizona Court Building Security Survey

Page 2 - Perimeter of the Court Building

* 7. Do you have the following security measures around the perimeter of your court building?

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras located around perimeter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alarmed entrances and exits	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Adequate exterior lighting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Bollards (barriers) to protect against vehicular assault	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant glass on doors and accessible windows	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Window coverings to prevent views into courtrooms, chambers, offices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 8. How well do you think the following security measures currently work around the perimeter of your court building?

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Do Not Have
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras located around perimeter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alarmed entrances and exits	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Adequate exterior lighting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Bollards (barriers) to protect against vehicular assault	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant glass on doors and accessible windows	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Window coverings to prevent views into courtrooms, chambers, offices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 9. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place around the perimeter of your court building?

	Most Important	Extremely Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat important	Not Very Important	Unimportant
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras located around perimeter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alarmed entrances and exits	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Adequate exterior lighting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Bollards (barriers) to protect against vehicular assault	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant glass on doors and accessible windows	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Window coverings to prevent views into courtrooms, chambers, offices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Arizona Court Building Security Survey

Page 3 - In the Court Building

* 10. Do you have the following security measures in your Court Building?

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command and control area	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras in publicly accessible areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public includes: Metal detector	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public includes: X-ray machine	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public includes: Hand wand	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for employees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees includes: Metal detector	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees includes: X-ray machine	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees includes: Hand wand	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security for after-hour access	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Protective covering (e.g. Plexiglas) at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening mail and packages	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergency equipment (e.g. fire alarms, AEDs)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Facility orientation procedures for first responders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Employee offices can be locked from the inside	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Procedures for sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 11. How well do you think the following security measures currently work in your Court Building?

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Don't Have	Don't Know
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command and control room	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras in publicly accessible areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for employees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security for after-hour access	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Protective covering (e.g. Plexiglas) at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening mail and packages	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergency equipment (e.g. fire alarms, AEDs)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Facility orientation procedures for first responders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Employee offices can be locked from the inside	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Procedures for sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 12. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place in your Court Building?

	Most Important	Extremely Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Unimportant
Active security/emergency preparedness committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command and control room	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras in publicly accessible areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for employees	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security for after-hour access	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Protective covering (e.g. Plexiglas) at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening mail and packages	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Emergency equipment (e.g. fire alarms, AEDs)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Facility orientation procedures for first responders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Employee offices can be locked from the inside.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Procedures for sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Arizona Court Building Security Survey

Page 4 - Courtroom

* 13. Do you have the following security measures for your courtroom?

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Security officers present at all courtroom proceedings	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Are officers in the courtroom armed?	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increased security for high profile cases	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody or remanded defendants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Decorum instructions/orders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Firearms in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Cell phone usage (including cameras and recording)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Designated emergency evacuation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Lockdown	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Shelter in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Seating assignments	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: On bench	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Duress alarms: At clerk station	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In chambers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular "sweeps" of courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Keeping courtroom doors locked when courtroom not in use.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 14. How well do you think the following security measures currently work for your courtroom?

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Don't Have	Don't Know
Security officers present at all courtroom proceedings	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Officers are armed in the courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increased security for high profile cases	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody or remanded defendants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Decorum instructions/orders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Firearms in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Cell phone usage (including cameras and recording)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Designated emergency evacuation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Lockdown	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Shelter in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Seating assignments	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	Don't Have	Don't Know
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: On bench	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: At clerk station	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In chambers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular "sweeps" of courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Keeping courtroom doors locked when courtroom not in use	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 15. How important do you think it is to have the following security measures in place for your courtroom?

	Most Important	Extremely Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Unimportant
Security officers present at all courtroom proceedings	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Officers are armed	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increased security for high profile cases	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Appropriate transport/control of in-custody or remanded defendants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Decorum instructions/orders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Firearms in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Most Important	Extremely Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Unimportant
Rules in place re.: Cell phone usage (including cameras and recording)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Designated emergency evacuation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Lockdown	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Shelter in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Rules in place re.: Seating assignments	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Process for alerting security re: threats/incidents in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: On bench	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: At clerk station	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In chambers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular "sweeps" of courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Keeping courtroom doors locked when courtroom not in use	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Arizona Court Building Security Survey

Page 5 - Training

* 16. Have you been trained since January 2015 on the following topics/areas?

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Court Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Security Officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Court Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Security Officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of new hire orientation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of employee transfer from another court.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Threats against judges/judicial officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Active Shooter/Shelter in Place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hostage taking	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Phone tree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Incident reporting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Communications: Whose directions to follow if security incident occurs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Items prohibited from the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Safety at home/to and from work	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mental health identification	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De-escalation tactics	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
CPR/AED/first aid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suspicious package	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cybersecurity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 17. How effective do you think the trainings in the following areas have been in your court building?

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	N/A	Don't Know
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Court Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Security Officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Court Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Security Officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of new hire orientation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Excellent	Good	Fair	Poor	N/A	Don't Know
Security training as part of employee transfer from another court	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Threats against judges/judicial officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Active Shooter/Shelter in Place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hostage taking	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Phone tree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Incident reporting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Whose directions to follow if security incident occurs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Items prohibited from the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Safety at home/to and from work	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mental health identification	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De-escalation tactics	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
CPR/AED/first aid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suspicious package	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cybersecurity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 18. How important do you think it is to have training in the following areas?

	Most Important	Extremely Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Unimportant
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Court Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written policies and procedures for court security, for Security Officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

	Most Important	Extremely Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Unimportant
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Court Staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of annual training requirements, for Security Officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of new hire orientation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of employee transfer from another court	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Threats against judges/judicial officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Active Shooter/Shelter in Place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hostage taking	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Phone tree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Incident reporting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Whose directions to follow if security incident occurs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Items prohibited from the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Safety at home/to and from work	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mental health identification	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De-escalation tactics	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
CPR/AED/first aid	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suspicious package	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cybersecurity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Arizona Court Building Security Survey

Page 6 - Last Questions

* 19. How important do you think it is to have security standards and guidelines in every court building?

Standards are those security measures that are readily achievable and would be required to be in place in every court building. Guidelines are those security measures that may take longer to achieve and would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

	Most Important	Extremely Important	Very Important	Important	Somewhat Important	Not Very Important	Unimportant
Security standards	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security guidelines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 20. What do you think is a reasonable time frame (in number of years) for implementing security standards and guidelines?

	One year	Two years	Three years	Four years	Five years
Security standards	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security guidelines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

* 21. When was the last time you had a practice evacuation of your court building (e.g., fire drill)?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't remember the last time

* 22. When was the last time you had an evacuation of your court building because of an actual emergency?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't remember the last time

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Monday, June 27, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, 1501 W. Washington – Conference Room 119 A/B

Conference Call: 602-452-3288 Access Code: 1328

[WebEx Link](#)

[CSSC Homepage](#)

AGENDA

- 10:00 a.m. Call to Order/ Welcome and Introductory Remarks *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- 10:10 a.m. Approval of Minutes, May 16, 2016, meeting *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
 Formal Action/Request
- 10:15 a.m. Presentation on Pima County Court Security Audit *Judge Kyle Bryson; Mary Jane Abril*
- 10:35 a.m. Review of Additional Survey Data *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Jennifer Albright*
- 11:00 a.m. Review of Draft Standards *All*
 - Framework
 - Discussion on language and edits
- 11:30 a.m. Small Group Work: Developing Standards *All*
-
- 12:00 Working Lunch**
-
- 2:00 p.m. Small Group Report Back and Discussion of Standards *All*
- 2:55 p.m. Announcements/Call to the Public *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- 3:00 p.m. Adjournment *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*

Next Meetings: July 15, 2016 - 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE (CSSC)

DRAFT MINUTES

May 16, 2016

10:00 a.m. – 2 p.m.

Conference Room 119 A/B

1501 W. Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Present: Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Mary Jane Abril, Richard Colwell, Greg DeMerritt, Rolf Eckel, Faye Guertin, Keith Kaplan, Judge Robert Krombeen, Sheriff Scott Mascher, Tina Mattison, John Phelps, Sheriff William Pribil, Commander Scott Slade

Telephonic: Joshua Halversen

Absent: Judge Kyle Bryson, Sean Gibbs

Guests: Timm Fautsko, National Center State Courts (NCSC); Earle Lloyd, Maricopa Superior Court Marshall's Office

Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) Guest: Dave Byers, Jeff Schrade

AOC Staff: Jennifer Albright, Sabrina Nash

Call to Order/Welcome and Introductions

Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair, called the meeting to order at 10:02 a.m. Mr. Reinkensmeyer inquired as to whether any members were on the phone. Marcus noted that Mr. Sean Gibbs, Security Director for Maricopa County Superior Court, is a newly appointed member of the Court Security Standards Committee. Unfortunately, Mr. Gibbs was unable to make the meeting. Mr. Reinkensmeyer then shared a few interesting news items related to court security around the country:

- **DeKalb County, Georgia** – A defendant was remanded into custody during a hearing for a non-violent offense. While handcuffed he broke free, made his way through an adjacent administrative building and out onto the street. In retrospect, it was determined that the court building never went into lockdown to prevent the defendant's escape or to protect the safety of the court staff. This security breach raised concerns in light of the escape of an in-custody individual that killed two court personnel in the recent past in a nearby court.
- **Payson Arizona** – Judge Dorothy Little, Associate Presiding Judge, has had a number of threats directed at her in her courtroom and through the clerk's office. There is no security at her court, so she made a request for a JSEF grant to employ a part-time bailiff to be in court when there is a full docket.
- **Nogales Arizona** – A magistrate who shares facilities with City Hall and the police department has had a number of security issues arise. The judge related that lack of security screening, no bailiff in attendance, no secure parking, and no bullet-proof bench make her and the court extremely vulnerable.

Approval of Minutes, March 22, 2016, meeting

Motion to approve minutes: Tina Mattison moved to approve the March 22, 2016, minutes as presented. **Seconded:** Commander Pribil **Vote:** unanimous

Review of Preliminary Survey Results

Marcus Reinkensmeyer provided a preliminary review of the survey process and discussed how Jennifer Albright sent out pre-mailings to let court staff know the survey was coming. The survey was routed through presiding judges, court administrators, court clerks, chief probation officers, and others. Mr. Reinkensmeyer stated that the response to the survey was good with the exception of the Division II Appellate Court in Tucson, and Jennifer Albright was going to follow up with them. Mr. Reinkensmeyer noted that 929 respondents opened the survey and 830 respondents actually completed the survey.

Timm Fautsko, National Center State Courts (NCSC), reiterated how important the information received from the survey is in developing standards. He stated that the most important information from the survey would be what the courts felt they needed. Mr. Fautsko noted, among other items, survey results show the courts need for training was uniformly high across all courts and types of court personnel.

Discussion took place regarding the ability to breakdown the survey data to specifically highlight the concerns of the different courts (rural v. metropolitan), how many courts have no security, and whether achievable standards can be developed for each court. Jennifer Albright indicated that the information could be delineated by how many of each court type responded, what the breakdown is of who responded from the courts i.e. how many judges, clerks, and other court staff. Jennifer noted that the results would then be compared among the different courts and court populations (rural v. metropolitan), security v. no security.

Developing Standards

Timm Fautsko, NCSC, defined a standard as "A policy or measure that is required to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees, law enforcement officers and court security staff." He then went on to state that a court security standard must meet the following criteria:

- Readily achievable - not too expensive, will not take longer than one year to implement, is not too politically controversial to implement;
- Have a compelling justification for making it a requirement, duress alarms for example;
- Supported by one or more web based servers

Mr. Fautsko then stated that when the Committee broke into workgroups, they would be tasked with developing at least one proposed standard. The workgroups were asked to consider whether the standard(s) selected met the criteria he had discussed. The workgroups were asked to carefully draft standards and then reconvene to present what they developed to the full committee.

Discussion occurred regarding the implementation of standards and whether development should hinge on financial ability to meet the standard. A couple of suggestions were made on how to implement standards without additional financing and options for creating funding for

future security standards. The timeline for implementing security standards and the possibility of phased standards was also discussed. Mr. Dave Byers, AOC, talked to the committee regarding the need for funding and how the Committee's input could help assess how much funding would be needed to implement the security standards they developed. He also suggested that any local court security committees should be established at the county level to reduce the number of meetings that judges, sheriffs, and law enforcement officers would need to attend monthly.

Small Group Work: Developing Standards

Ms. Jennifer Albright, AOC, explained that she emailed committee members several documents and she created a packet for each workgroup with those same documents which include the survey data, an overview of the data created by the NCSC consultants, and recommended standards created by Tim Faustko and Steve Berson. She outlined how she envisioned the workgroups would debate each item and asked the workgroups to focus on the standards for their individual workgroup.

The committee then broke out into their workgroups to work on drafting of security standards for the courtroom, court house, court perimeter and security training for court security officers and court staff.

Small Group Report Back and Discussion of Standards

After lunch the committee regrouped and the four workgroups reported on their standards:

- **Court security committee:**
 - Each court or court building is required to have a court security committee that meets at least quarterly
 - The chair of the committee would be the presiding judge or designee
 - The chairperson shall appoint members to the committee to include a local first responder and member of law enforcement
 - Each county shall establish a county court security committee chaired by the Superior Court presiding judge or designee and a representative from each court's security committee and other members as appointed by the presiding judge.
 - The county security committee would meet at least biannually
 - The function of the committee would be to help implement standards as designated by the Court Security Standards Committee and to work towards resource needs and continuous court security improvement
- **Education/Training:**
 - Cyber security currently mandated statewide via COJET
 - Standard of training for all new court hires shall include information on de-escalation, mental illnesses, the different aspects of security both internal and external, active shooter, hostage-taking and sheltering in place
 - Offer online and in person training on active shooter and hostage-taking
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- **Courtrooms:**
 - Monitored duress alarms for the bench, chambers
 - Access control of ingress/egress areas of the courtroom such as deliberation room, judge's chambers
 - Locked courtrooms when not in use
 - Assign security personnel for the transportation and control of defendant in custody and protocol for taking defendant into custody
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 - Routine courtroom security sweeps, can be done by trained court staff
 - Posted signage for courtrooms that outlines what is allowed in courtrooms, what to do in case of an emergency and decorum standards
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- **Perimeter of Building:**
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 - Courts shall be required to have window coverings that prevent views into the court building but doesn't restrict views to the outside
 - Parking shall be monitored and secured if possible

Announcements/Call to the Public

No members of the public were present

Next Committee Meeting Date:

Monday, June 27, 2016

10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Arizona State Court Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

1501 West Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Adjourned at 2:27 p.m.

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Monday, June 27, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, 1501 W. Washington – Conference Room 119 A/B

Conference Call: 602-452-3288 Access Code: 1328

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AGENDA

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- 12:00 Working Lunch**
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Next Meetings: July 15, 2016 - 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

All times are approximate. The Chair reserves the right to set the order of the agenda. For any item on the agenda, the Committee may vote to go into executive session as permitted by Arizona Code of Judicial Administration § 1-202. Please contact Jennifer Albright, staff to the Court Security Standards Committee, at (602) 452-3453, with any questions concerning this agenda. Persons with a disability may request a reasonable accommodation, such as auxiliary aids or materials in alternative formats, by contacting Sabrina Nash at (602) 452-3849. Requests should be made as early as possible to allow time to arrange for the accommodation.

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE (CSSC)

DRAFT MINUTES

May 16, 2016

10:00 a.m. – 2 p.m.

Conference Room 119 A/B

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Phoenix, Arizona 85007

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Approval of Minutes, March 22, 2016, meeting

Motion to approve minutes: Tina Mattison moved to approve the March 22, 2016, minutes as presented. **Seconded:** Commander Pribil **Vote:** unanimous

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Announcements/Call to the Public

No members of the public were present

Next Committee Meeting Date:

Monday, June 27, 2016

10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Arizona State Court Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

1501 West Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Adjourned at 2:27 p.m.

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Tuesday, July 26, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, 1501 W. Washington – Conference Room 119 A/B

Conference Call: 602-452-3288 Access Code: 3868

[WebEx Link](#) [CSSC Homepage](#)

AGENDA

10:00 a.m. Call to Order/Welcome and Introductory Remarks *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*

10:15 a.m. Approval of Minutes, June 27, 2016, meeting *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
 Formal Action/Request

10:20 a.m. Court Security Funding Strategies *Marcus Reinkensmeyer*

11:00 a.m. Review of Draft Standards *All*

- Discussion on language and edits to standards
- Discussion of comments; notes; and data inclusion related to each standard

 Formal Action/Request

12:00 Working Lunch

12:30 p.m. Review and Discussion of Draft Report *All*

1:15 p.m. Discussion of Resources and Tools for Inclusion *All*
in Appendices of Report

1:55 p.m. Announcements/Call to the Public *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*

2:00 p.m. Adjournment *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*

Next Meetings: Monday, September 12, 2016 - 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE (CSSC)

DRAFT MINUTES

June 27, 2016

10:00 a.m. – 3 p.m.

Conference Room 119 A/B

1501 W. Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Present: Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Mary Jane Abril, Judge Kyle Bryson, Richard Colwell, Greg DeMerritt, Rolf Eckel, Sean Gibbs, Faye Guertin, Judge Ron Krombeen, Tina Mattison, Sheriff William Pribil, Commander Scott Slade,

Telephonic: Keith Kaplan

Absent: Joshua Halverson, Sheriff Scott Masher, Scott Phelps

Guests: Earle Lloyd, Superior Court in Maricopa County, Marshall's Office

Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) Guest: Dave Byers, Mike Baumstark, Jeff Schrade

AOC Staff: Jennifer Albright, Sabrina Nash

Call to Order/Welcome and Introductions

Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair, called the meeting to order at 10:03 a.m. Mr. Reinkensmeyer welcomed Mr. Sean Gibbs who is the new director of Security for the Superior Court in Maricopa County.

Jennifer Albright announced that the July 15 meeting was moved to July 26 and there would be no August meeting. The next scheduled committee meeting is Monday, September 12, 2016.

Approval of Minutes

Motion to approve minutes: Judge Bryson moved to approve the May 16, 2016, minutes as presented. **Seconded:** Sheriff Pribil **Vote:** unanimous

Presentation on Pima County Court Security Audit

Judge Kyle Bryson and Mary Jane Abril gave a presentation on series of recent court security audits of courts located in Pima County. Judge Bryson prefaced his presentation by stating that his interest in court security stems from a January 2013 incident when local attorney Mark Hummels was shot and killed. That incident and a few others that occurred near that time acted as a confluence of events to bring court security to the forefront of his work as Presiding Judge. As such, he developed a plan to ensure the safety of the courts and court staff and put into motion audits of court safety and security.

Mary Jane Abril explained that she created a checklist of twenty-four safety issues that she examines when performing court security audits. She has audited five courts: South Tucson, Ajo, Marana, and Sahaurita city courts. Ms. Abril met with the court administrator or designee of

each court to inform them that her purpose was to focus on what they are doing well and what they could improve on. The audits have three components: interview the court administrator or designee, conduct the audit with checklist, and provide the presiding judge (Judge Bryson) with a written report and photographs for them to share with the judge of that court to discuss findings and areas of concern/improvement. Ms. Abril identified the top seven security issues that she encountered during court audits:

- Lack of courtroom security protocols – either not having one at all or not having a protocol for high risk trials
- Court security procedures – screening measures, reporting protocol (how to notify a judge if the judge was threatened by a litigant)
- Emergency management planning – only one court audited had an emergency management plan (managing the incident as it is unfolding in front of us)
- Alarms and camera systems - access to cameras and alarms (in house versus outside monitoring)
- Key control – no key control system in place or if the court did not have an inventory or audit of keys assigned to employees who had left the court.
- Safes/vaults –no policy for the safety and security of deposits
- IT security – often the city or county managed IT security and the courts were not involved in that process, leaving the courts with limited access and knowledge of the IT security related to the court computer systems, records databases, etc.

Judge Bryson indicated that Ms. Abril has been instrumental the handling of the audits and that the courts have been cooperative and receptive of the audits. The courts that were audited found the audits to be positive and helpful in raising awareness of security needs and provided assistance in seeking funds for improved court security from funding bodies.

Review of Additional Survey Data

Jennifer Albright stated that she had a conversation with the National Center on how best to get the information that the committee requested on court size and population and the decision was to breakdown the survey information based on what the courts have, level of court and population. This will provide a better indication of what the courts have in relation to creating standards and guidelines.

Review of Draft Standards and Draft Report and Recommendations

Marcus Reinkensmeyer identified the first three parts of the draft report and recommendations of the Committee:

1. Introduction – inclusion of the administrative order, scope of the Committee’s charge and a summary of survey development and results
2. Definitions – an explanation of words/phrases
3. Court Security Standards – the detailed standards proposed by the Committee

The committee reviewed the twenty-two proposed standards for clarity of language, enhancements, and deficits. Additional items for consideration and definition included:

- In event of building evacuation (fire/bomb threat) how far away should evacuees be from the court?
- Incident reporting - statewide ACIC/NCIC database available to all courts and law enforcement

- Definition of armed court personnel (firearms, pepper spray, tasers)
- Judges parking (location, lighting, security; future discussion in security planning)
- Situational/Personal security awareness training for judges and court staff
- Written protocol for monitoring and/or releasing of video footage
- Standard for random employee screening upon entrance of the courthouse

Small Group Work

The committee broke into workgroups to review and refine proposed standards related to their work group assignments as well as determine if any additional standards should be proposed.

Small Group Reports

A summary of topics reported to the full Committee by the work groups includes:

Training

Standardized AOC approved new hire and annual training for court and judicial employees

Standardized training for armed/unarmed court security personnel (may be determined by how many court security officers are needed among the 161 courts)

Use of standard training tools

Create an AOC approved list of standardized trainers as a reference for the courts

Courthouse Security

Refined language regarding who provides in-custody transport of defendants

Refined language regarding multiple entry ways and when multiple entryways are permissible

Recommended random employee screening based on best practices suitable for court size

Recommended language that "courts shall/should have security cameras at entryway, public common areas and exterior of court."

Recommend electronic key card or hard key access for all non-public areas

Recommended IT wiring closets shall be closed/secured at all times

Courthouse Perimeter Security

Parking - no cost effective solution was reached

Refined language that perimeter cameras should/shall be recorded for intelligence or investigative purposes

Additional recommendations for consideration:

Funding

Security audits

Announcements/Call to the Public

No public in attendance

Next Committee Meeting Date:

July 26, 2016, 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.

Arizona State Court Building, Conference Room 119 A/B

Adjourned at 2:34 p.m.



ENSURING OPEN, SECURE, PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE COURTS

Report and Recommendations of the
Court Security Standards Committee

September 2016

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Court Security Standards Committee

Mr. Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair
AOC – Court Services Division

Mr. Greg DeMerritt
Superior Court in Pima County

Sheriff Scott Mascher
Yavapai County Sheriff’s Office

Mr. C. Rolf Eckel
Superior Court in Yavapai County

Sheriff William Pribil
Coconino County Sheriff’s Office

Ms. Faye Guertin
Chandler Municipal Court

Mr. Sean Gibbs
Superior Court in Maricopa County –
Marshall’s Office

Mr. Joshua Halversen
Superior Court in Graham County

Mr. Scott Slade
Superior Court in Maricopa County –
Marshall’s Office

Mr. Keith Kaplan
Fountain Hills Municipal Court

Ms. Mary Jane Abril
Superior Court in Pima County

Honorable Robert Krombeen
William Justice & Municipal Court

Honorable Kyle Bryson
Superior Court in Pima County

Ms. Tina M. Mattison
Pima County Juvenile Court

Mr. Richard Colwell
Superior Court in Yuma County

Mr. John Phelps, Esq.
State Bar of Arizona

Committee Staff

Ms. Jennifer R. Albright
AOC- Court Programs Unit

Ms. Sabrina Nash
AOC – Court Programs Unit

National Center for State Courts

Mr. Timothy Fautsko

Mr. Steven Berson

Mr. Kent Kelley

Other Resources

Mr. Earle Lloyd
Superior Court in Maricopa County –
Marshall’s Office

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A. Creation and Charge of the Court Security Standards Committee

Administrative Order 2015-104 established the statewide Court Security Standards Committee (“Committee”) directing the Committee to:

- (a) develop and conduct a survey of court security measures in Arizona,
- (b) develop recommendations on standards for courthouse and courtroom security,
- (c) develop recommendations on security officer training, and
- (d) submit a final report summarizing the Committee’s work and recommendations by September 30, 2016.

The Committee was assisted by National Center for State Courts (“NCSC”) consultants Timothy Fautsko, Steven Berson, and Kent Kelley. Based on the recommendations of the NCSC consultant, Timm Fautsko, the Committee established four (4) work groups: perimeter, courthouse, courtroom, and training. The work group division was based in part on data reflecting where security incidents occurred in relation to the courthouse as reflected in the NCSC *Status of Court Security in State Courts* report. Moreover, work groups were essential for digesting large amounts of information related to court security measures and standards and creating initial drafts of survey questions and standards for the full committee to review, provide feedback, edit, and ultimately develop consensus on for adoption as recommendations here in this report.

B. Abbreviated Committee Recommendations

Below is an abbreviated list of the recommendations of the Court Security Standards Committee. The detailed proposed court security standards and additional recommendations of the Committee are set forth in the body of the report.

- ❖ Adoption of the proposed court security standards as mandatory standards for courts statewide with a three year implementation period. The standards address the following:
 - Governance of court security, supporting committee structures and planning,

- Entryway screening,
 - Equipment, including metal detectors, duress alarms, and video cameras,
 - Protocols for prisoner transport and defendant remand,
 - Facilities, including secure circulation patterns, bullet resistant courtroom benches, bullet proof public service counter barriers, and locking doors,
 - Training for judges, court personnel, and court security officers.
- ❖ Create a standing committee on court security and emergency preparedness to promote timely implementation of the proposed court security standards and continuous court security improvement statewide.
 - ❖ Establish statewide security funds that will be available for statewide staff security training, and to local courts for one-time outlays for security equipment and system improvements.
 - ❖ Provide dedicated state level (AOC) staff support for coordination of court security assessments, technical assistance, and statewide training.
 - ❖ Include a mechanism for assessing court compliance with the proposed court security standards, particularly standards related to training and certification requirements and testing of equipment.

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE**

I. INTRODUCTION

A. COURT SECURITY TODAY


Court security addresses the need to prevent disturbances and acts of violence that can impede the administration of justice as mandated in the Constiution of the State of Arizona.

Increasingly, court security is at the forefront of issues faced by every judicial branch in the United States. A March 11, 2005, security incident at the Fulton County Courthouse in Atlanta, Georgia, resulted in the deaths of a judge and court reporter, shot in a courtroom, and the deaths of a sheriff’s deputy and U.S. Customs Agent after the inmate fled the courthouse. That incident is often cited is the turning point for state courts and the issue of court security. However, ten years later, national and local data reflect not only an increase in security threats and violent incidents, but that data also indicates available funding from state and local governments for security staffing, security plans, and security equipment continues to be limited.¹ Tragically, even as this Committee was working toward its recommendations and drafting this report, the Superior Court of Navajo County in Holbrook, Arizona, experienced a shooting incident in front of the courthouse that left two family court litigants dead and one other injured.


In 2013, incident data gathered by the Center for Judicial and Executive Security (CJES) reflected, “the number of security threats and violent incidents in court buildings has increased

¹ Timm Fautsko, et. al. *Courthouse Security Incidents Trending Upward: The challenges Facing State Courts Today*, pp. 102-106. Future Trends in State Courts 2012.

dramatically in recent years.”² The upward trend in number of incidents, reflected by decade, is as follows:



The CJES Court-Targeted Acts of Violence (CTAV) study also examined where incidents took place. A subset of that data focused on location of incidents from 2005 to 2012 and revealed the following:³



² Timothy F. Fautsko, et. al. *Status of Court Security In State Courts, A National Perspective*, 7. National Center for State Courts & Bureau of Justice Assistance, June 2013. See also CJES May 31, 2010 study on Court-Targeted Acts of Violence; Timm Fautsko, et. al. *Courthouse Security Incidents Trending Upward: The Challenges facing State Courts Today*. Future Trends in State Courts, pp. 102-106 (2012).

³ Timothy F. Fautsko, et. al. *Status of Court Security In State Courts, A National Perspective*, Figure 4-2, p 4-6. National Center for State Courts & Bureau of Justice Assistance, June 2013.

The Status of Court Security, a report by the National Center for State Courts, included national and local data from 225 reports of court security assessments, data on security incidents gathered by CJES, a comprehensive web survey of state, local, tribal, and territorial courts, and a telephonic survey of court security directors. The report ultimately recommended the following future directions to improve court security in the United States:

- (1) accept the challenge that doing nothing is not an option;
- (2) understanding that local, state, regional, and national communication and collaboration are key for success;
- (3) providing additional funding to improve staffing and equipment is essential; and
- (4) coordinating and supporting state court security programs is a definite need that must be answered.⁴

National studies and reports are not the only source of information and data related to the state of court security. Increasingly, state judiciaries and local courts are conducting security assessments, convening court security committees to study court security needs at the local level, and addressing funding needs associated with increased court security. One only need to peruse the internet to see examples of court security standards implemented by state and local courts around the country, news reports of security incidents, and information on the continued issue of lack of funding to provide adequate security staff and security equipment. It is against this backdrop that the Arizona Supreme Court's Court Security Standards Committee was created and against which it conducted its work.

⁴ Timothy F. Fautsko, et. al. *Status of Court Security In State Courts, A National Perspective*, p. v-vi, National Center for State Courts & Bureau of Justice Assistance, June 2013.

B. COURT SECURITY SURVEY

i. Survey Methodology

After review of the Administrative Order's charge and review of state and national court security surveys, the Committee ultimately focused the survey on two question types. The first to assess what security measures were in place in Arizona courts and the second to determine how those surveyed felt about the security measures. Several additional questions related to demographics of respondents were determined to be important to the process of developing standards due to the various court types (jurisdiction), population, and facility types that make up the Arizona judiciary.

The Committee quickly decided the survey should be distributed to all court levels in the Arizona judiciary: appellate, superior, justice, and municipal courts. The audience for the survey was: judges and other judicial officers; court administrators; clerks of court and office staff; chief probation officers; court security personnel and law enforcement; and employees of agencies sharing buildings with courts.

Survey distribution involved a pre-survey email, a follow-up email 24 hours later containing the link to the survey, and a reminder email 48 hours before the survey closed. Presiding judges were asked to distribute to other judges and other judicial officers; court administrators to forward to other administrative staff and those providing court security; Clerks of Court to clerk's office staff; and chief probation officers to other probation officers. Examples of survey distribution emails can be found in Appendix B.

ii. Survey development.

Survey creation resulted from a three-prong approach. First, Committee members received and reviewed a number of resources including, national reports on court security, questions used

in other court security surveys, best practices for court security, other states' court security standards, and a summary of the state of court security in the United States. Members also reviewed results from national surveys, as well as data related to the types of security incidents and threats across several decades. (See Appendix A.)

Next, the work groups met during breakout sessions over the course of several meetings to develop lists of security measures and policies for which the survey should assess. The list retained items based on consensus of the entire committee, otherwise items were removed from the list.

Finally, once the Committee determined it had developed sufficient lists of topics and specific security measures to assess in the survey, staff to the committee developed a list of survey questions and staff at the NCSC developed a draft survey. The Committee then made edits to the survey questions and refined organizational aspects of the survey. NCSC consultants provided input on question wording, organization, and technical aspects of the survey tool. Several rounds of the drafting and editing process occurred before the Committee determined the survey was ready for testing.

iii. Survey testing

Committee staff, NCSC staff, and selected court staff conducted tests of the survey. The first test revealed the survey took too long to complete. The Committee determined that a set of questions related to effectiveness of security measures was not likely to produce results that would assist in the charge of developing security standards; therefore, that line of questions was removed. After several additional revisions related to language consistency and conciseness, the Committee approved and retested the survey. Based on the feedback received, final edits to the survey were made and the survey was approved for distribution. (See Appendix C for survey.)

iv. Survey results

The survey was opened by 929 people and completed by 830 people with partial replies being of varying lengths, depending on when each individual respondent dropped out of the survey. The number of respondents roughly corresponded to the relative population of each individual county. Every county provided at least seven (7) responses, resulting in representative data. County response data was as follows:

[JENNIFER IS WORKING ON DATA AND CHARTS RELATED TO SURVEY RESULTS
TO INCLUDE IN THIS SECTION]

II. RECOMMENDATIONS OF COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

A. PREAMBLE


*“Security is not a one time achievement.
It is a serious and continuous goal and requires constant vigilance.”⁵*

Through its research and discussion, the Committee concluded that court security can only be maintained through an ongoing process of continuous improvement. (See Figure 1.) For a comprehensive approach, oversight of court security should also include business continuity planning and encompass emergency preparedness.

Proposed Standard 1 calls for the formation of standing local and countywide court security and emergency preparedness committees. Composed of representatives of the court, law enforcement, first responders, and other stakeholders, these committees are to provide policy direction and planning recommendations on all facets of court security and emergency preparedness.

Specifically, as envisioned, the court security and emergency preparedness committees are to address risk assessment, policies and procedures, deterrence measures, and debriefing of security incidents in three interrelated spheres: (1) court operations, (2) facilities and equipment, and (3) training and communication. (See Figure 1.) The efficacy of security policies and practices should be evaluated through periodic drills and audits. This ongoing process will provide the court security and emergency preparedness committees and judicial leadership valuable feedback and actionable recommendations to maximize court security.

⁵ Timothy J. Fautsko, et. al. *Steps to Best Practices for Court Security*, p. 2. National Center for State Courts, January 2013.



B. PROPOSED COURT SECURITY STANDARDS

Several of the proposed court security standards include comments, which include explanatory information, exceptions to the standard, or other important factors for consideration in adoption of the standard. Each standard includes reference to survey data from the Arizona Court Security Survey and reference to other resources considered by the Committee in its drafting of the standard.

ADMINISTRATION

1. Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Committees. Each court or court building shall have a court security and emergency preparedness committee that meets at least quarterly. The chairperson of the court security committee shall be the presiding judge or designee [AJ1] and chairperson shall appoint members of the security committee. The committee shall include at least one representative from law enforcement and/or a first responder. These committees shall meet at least quarterly.

In addition, the presiding judge of the superior court in each county shall establish a court security and emergency preparedness committee chaired by the presiding judge or designee [AJ2] of superior court. The committee shall consist of a representative from each court security committee from each court or court building in the county. The presiding judge may appoint other members as deemed necessary. The committee shall meet at least biannually.⁶

The functions of each court security and emergency preparedness committee are implementation of court security standards as developed by the Court Security Standards Committee and adopted by the Supreme Court of Arizona, development and allocation of resources necessary for security needs, and ensuring continuous court security improvement.

Comment: Courts co-located in a space with other agencies or businesses should include a representative of those other agencies or businesses on the local court security and emergency preparedness committee. Survey results indicate 57.8% of respondent court employees are from courts co-located in buildings with other agencies or entities. As such, the likelihood that a security incident would impact other agencies or entities that are co-located with a court is relatively high. Therefore, the role other agencies or businesses may play in the safety and security of the building

⁶ Footnote the AO that gives presiding judges authority over building security.

and the public is an important aspect of security and emergency preparedness planning that requires inclusion of representatives from those other agencies or entities.

Survey Reference Justification: 46% Extremely Important, 22% Very Important, 22% Important.

2. **Court Security Manual.** The Arizona Administrative Office of Courts shall develop and promulgate a court security manual that contains the basic tenets of court safety and security, including court security standards, court security assessment or audit tools (see Appendix D-*, example from Pima County), security incident and threat reporting forms, personal security tips for judges and court personnel (see Appendix D-*, NCSC tips for personal security), and templates for written policies on evacuations, hostage situations, sheltering in place, and bomb threats (see Appendix D-*, MN Judicial Branch negative event cards).

The manual shall include practical tools, checklists, and templates for use by state and local courts. (See Appendix D for example resources.) Each court may add additional security related information and written policies and procedures to the manual unique to the needs and resources of that court.

Court security manual training shall be provided to employees upon hire or transfer to each court location and training on security manual updates shall occur annually. (see Standard 26.)

3. **Court Security Audit.** Courts should conduct a court security audit biennially. The court security and emergency preparedness committee should oversee the audit. A court security audit checklist should be used to ensure that no areas are overlooked and a report should be made on the audit results that is shared with the court's security and emergency preparedness committee for use in developing plans for security improvement and for resource justification. (See Appendix D-* for an example audit checklist and audit report template from Pima County.)

4. **Response to a Negative Event.** Court staff shall be trained on how to react to and report negative events. Each court shall have access to an emergency number or access and contact information for a control center operated by law enforcement. See the Glossary for definition of ‘negative event’.

5. **Incident and Threat Reporting.** The court administrator or lead clerk shall report through a reporting system established by the Administrative Office of Courts, all threats made against a court, judge, or court employee, and all incidents that occur within the courthouse or its perimeter. The Committee has identified two levels of incident reporting: (a) contemporaneous reporting of major security threats and incidents, and (b) annual reporting of security incident data by courthouse. Information from the first type of incident report shall be shared with court security and law enforcement officials on a statewide basis in the form of security alerts. The second form of incident reporting will serve as a basis for determining areas for security improvement and for resources justification.

Comment: See the Glossary for definition of ‘incident’ and ‘threat’. The purpose of this standard is to track types of incidents and threats, the manner in which threats are made, and the venue in which an incident occurred (e.g. public counter, courtroom, entryway). It is a national best practice for courts to maintain a record of all threats and incidents for local decision-making related to security measures and funding. Incident and threat reports shall not disseminate confidential or sensitive information as defined by Rule 123, Arizona Rules of Supreme Court.

Survey Reference Justification: 67% Extremely Important, 21% Very Important.

ENTRY SCREENING

6. **Entryway^[AJ3] Screening.** Each court shall establish only one main entrance through which the public can enter the court building. Additional entryways for the public are only allowed if all

public entryways are staffed and utilize entryway screening of at least a metal detector. Additional entrances may be established to comply with ADA standards; however, appropriate screening of individuals using such entrances is required.

Courts shall establish and maintain entryway screening of all visitors to courthouse facilities, using walk through and or handheld metal detectors (magnetometers). For enhanced security, courts may also opt to use x-ray (fluoroscope) machines in conjunction with metal detector screening.

Each court building shall post signage at the main entrance that states all persons are subject to search by security and that firearms and dangerous weapons are prohibited^[AJ4]. See A.R.S. 13-

Each court shall provide secure lockers at the entryway for law enforcement to secure their service weapons if they appear at the court as a witness in their official capacity or to participate in cases as a party. (See Standard 9, Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses.)

7. Judicial and Court Employee Screening. Each court must develop a policy on, and carry out, random court employee screening upon entry to the courthouse.

Comment: Unfortunately workplace violence is all too common. It is the risk of work place violence that can be mitigated through periodic employee screening.

8. Access to a Metal Detector (magnetometer) or Handheld Wand for High Risk Events.

Courts are required to have available at least one metal detector (magnetometer) or one handheld wand in their court building for use in the event of a high risk event. Appropriate court personnel must be trained and regularly re-certified in the operation of these devices. Each court shall ensure that regular calibration and testing of metal detectors.

Comment: High risk event is defined in the Glossary.

Survey Reference Justification: 85% of courts responding have a metal detector at a screening station.

9. Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses. The presiding judge at each court shall determine whether court security officers, bailiffs, judicial officers, and/or other court staff are authorized to be armed in the courthouse. Required training as approved by the Administrative Office of Courts must be completed prior to any authorized person being actively armed in the courthouse.⁷

Comment: Courts authorizing court security officers, bailiffs, judicial officers, and/or other court staff to be armed, should, through the court security and emergency preparedness committee, develop a written policy. The policy should address the following points: types of employees that may be authorized to carry a firearm, the process for obtaining authorization to be armed, process for confirming training requirements, type of ammunition that can be carried when armed in the court building, the type of firearm that may be carried in the courthouse, conformance with all state and local statutes and ordinances.

The^[AJS] Committee further recommends that courts adopt a policy prohibiting law officers appearing at court as witnesses in their official capacity or to participate in cases as a party from carrying service weapons in the courthouse and require those officers to go through regular screening procedures. However, if a court chooses to allow law enforcement officers to carry their service weapon and bypass regular security screening when appearing at court as witnesses in their official capacity or to participate in cases carry their service weapon they should only do so after assessing the specific impact of such policy on the court and court security. The committee further recommends if law enforcement officers are allowed to carry their service weapon in the

⁷ This standard does not apply to the Sheriff's officers who are present at a court under A.R.S. § 11-411(A)(4) (2009).

courthouse in such circumstances, officers shall be required to go through a registration procedure so that security is aware of their location in the courthouse.

IN-CUSTODY DEFENDANTS

10. **Entrance for In-custody Defendants.** Courts shall ensure in-custody defendants are brought into and leave the court building through an entrance separate from the public entrance(s) to the courthouse.

Comment: Exceptions to this standard due to architectural construct of a building can apply for a waiver from the Administrative Office of Courts. Courts requesting a waiver shall have written procedures for ensuring in-custody defendants are segregated from the public when entering and exiting the court to ensure the safety of all.

Survey Reference Justification: 76% Extremely Important, 17% Very Important.

11. **In-custody** ^[AJ6] **Defendants; Transport and Control.** In-custody defendants must be controlled, and monitored at all times by appropriately trained personnel.

<<OR>>

Courts shall have at least one appropriately trained security personnel or law enforcement officer to transport, monitor and guard in-custody defendants transported from custody to the courthouse. At least one appropriately trained security personnel or law enforcement officer is required to accompany in-custody ^[AJ7] defendants at all times.

Survey Reference Justification: Survey Reference Justification: 73% Extremely Important, 16% Very Important.

12. **In-custody Defendants; Protocols for Taking Individuals Into Custody.** Court shall have written protocols for taking individuals into custody and securing individuals into custody for transport to a detention facility. Courts should make every effort alert security personnel or law

enforcement responsible for transporting detainees in advance if it is anticipated a litigant will be sentenced to the immediate custody of a county jail or correctional facility or otherwise taken into custody on legal grounds.

FACILITIES, ALARMS, EQUIPMENT

13. Duress Alarms

(a) At Public Transaction Counters. Courts are required to have at least one active and monitored duress alarm “panic button” behind each public transaction counter.

Survey Reference Justification: 73% Extremely Important, 17% Very Important.

(b) In the Courtroom. Courts are required to have active and monitored duress alarm “panic buttons” at the judges’ or other judicial officers’ benches and at the courtroom clerks’ stations.

Survey Reference Justification, Bench: 79% Extremely Important, 13% Very Important.

Survey Reference Justification, Clerks Station: 78% Extremely Important, 13% Very Important.

(c) Training On and Testing of Duress Alarms. The court administrator or lead clerk or their designee shall physically show all employees working in a court building the location of duress alarm “panic buttons” and how and when to use them. The court administrator or lead clerk or their designee shall ensure and document monthly testing of duress alarm systems. Reports of duress alarm system testing shall be reported annually to the Administrative Office of Courts.

Survey Reference Justification: 67% Extremely Important, 20% Very Important.

14. Locked Courtrooms. Courts shall keep public doors to the courtroom locked at all times when a courtroom is not in use^{[A]8}.

15. Courtroom Sweeps. Bailiffs, or a designee of the Presiding Judge or Court Administrator, shall ensure sweeps of courtrooms and hearing rooms are conducted at least daily. Reports of courtroom sweeps shall be subject to review by or reporting to the Administrative Office of Courts.

Survey Reference Justification: 59% Extremely Important, 22% Very Important.

Survey Reference Justification: 69% Extremely Important, 16% Very Important.

16. Locked Jury Deliberation Rooms. Courts shall keep jury deliberation rooms locked when not in use, unless jury deliberation rooms are behind secured areas.

Survey Reference Justification: 64% Extremely Important, 20% Very Important.

17. Secured Access to Non-Public Areas. Areas of the court not open to the public shall be electronic card key or hard key controlled. The court administrator or designee shall ensure doors remain locked at all times and are not propped open.

18. Security Cameras. Courts shall have video cameras in entryways, common public areas, and around the facility perimeter. **Cameras should be equipped with the appropriate lens for the area they will cover.**

19. Exterior Lighting. Each court location shall have exterior lighting at building entrances and exits.

Survey Reference Justification: 73% Extremely Important, 18% Very Important.

20. Bollards. **Courts shall ensure sufficient set back areas between the court facility and vehicle accessible areas, and shall install bollards to protect the building perimeter and entrances.**

Comment: **Exceptions to this standard due to architectural construct of a building can apply for a waiver from the Administrative Office of Courts. Courts requesting a waiver shall have written procedures for ensuring security monitoring of areas where vehicle accessibility is within what would otherwise be the standard set back area.**

21. Window Coverings. Courts shall have window coverings to prevent views from the outside into courtrooms, chambers, and judicial offices. Window coverings must allow visibility from inside to the outside.

Survey Reference Justification: 58% Extremely Important, 23% Very Important.

22. **Ballistic Proof Glass.** Clerk transaction counters and public service windows shall have a ballistic proof glass barrier with appropriate pass-through openings installed between the public customers and court staff.

23. **Bullet Resistant Material in Courtrooms.** Judge benches and staff work areas in courtrooms shall be equipped with bullet resistant material.

24. **Standard Equipment Belt Tools for Court Security Officers^{[A]9}.** Court security officers restrict equipment belt tools to items the officer is trained and certified in the use of and to items approved by the in-service court security officer-training program adopted by the Administrative Office of Courts. (See Standard 28.)

25. **Data Centers and Electronic Equipment.** Court facilities shall maintain separate, secure electronic key card or hard key controlled areas for computer data centers, network equipment, video recording systems and other critical electronic equipment. Courts shall maintain remote, off-site disaster recovery “hot sites.”

TRAINING

26. **Security Training Required at New Hire Orientation.** All judicial employees, including judges and judicial staff, shall, within three (3) months of their hire date with a court, participate in and complete, whether in person or online, at least two (2) hours of court security training that involves the court security manual, personal safety on the job and emergency preparedness, including what to do in a negative event.

Comment: The two (2) hours of training should bear a relationship to the position for which the new employee is hired. For example, employees who will interact with the public would have

training focused on topics such as evacuation routes, safety to and from work, de-escalation tactics, or mental health awareness training.

Survey Reference Justification: 64% Extremely Important, 23% Very Important.

27. Annual Security Training Requirements for All Judicial Employees. All employees of the Arizona Judicial branch shall complete a minimum of two hours of security related training each year.

Comment: The Committee recognizes the current requirement that one (1) hour of COJET training related to cyber security is required and that cyber security training likely will continue to be a mandatory component of COJET training. The Committee recommends that the second hour of training be different each year and recommends the AOC, Education Services Division, develop a series of security related trainings to be offered on a rotational basis.

28. In-Service Court Security Officer Training. Court security officers employed by a court must receive annual training and recertification on the following: firearms, if armed; metal detection devices and x-ray machines, as applicable to what the officer uses at their court; de-escalation tactics^{[A]10}; active shooter; and emergency preparedness.

Comment: The Committee recommends that a security training workgroup collaborate with the AOC, Education Services Division, to determine the specific training curriculum and annual training hours necessary for an effective, ongoing security officer training education and certification program such as an Arizona Court Security Officer Academy or Arizona Court Security Officer Training program.

29. Active Shooter/Sheltering in Place. All employees are required to participate in and complete an active shooter and sheltering in place training program every three years.

Survey Reference Justification: 69% Extremely Important, 21% Very Important.


30. Cyber and Information Technology (IT) Security. The AOC, Education Services Division, shall ensure that adequate, relevant, and up-to-date cyber and information technology training is provided to all newly hired employees as well as available for all employees as part of annual COJET security training.⁸

C. RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

During the development of the survey and standards, the Committee considered a number of related measures to ensure a continued focus on court security and an ongoing program of security system improvements. To this end, the Committee respectfully offers the following recommendations:

1. Establish statewide security funds that will be available for statewide staff security training, and to local courts for one-time outlays for security equipment and security system improvements. Security system improvements entail, but are not limited to, security system screening equipment, panic alarms, bullet proof glass, bullet resistant courtroom benches, video cameras and communication systems. Specifically, the committee recommends expansion of spending authority for some current state and local fee funds (e.g., court diversion fee or county law library fund) for security enhancements. Under this model, the trial courts will continue to pursue local funding for court security personnel and ongoing operations.

⁸ The AOC, Education Services division current requires one (1) hour of COJET training annually on the topic of cyber and information technology security.



2. Provide dedicated state level (AOC) staff support for coordination of court security assessments, technical assistance, and training. This position should also assist in oversight of compliance with any standards adopted by the **Arizona Judicial Council [Supreme Court of Arizona]**. The Committee notes that a staff member dedicated to court security would allow for court security to be pursued in an active rather than reactive manner.
3. Maintain the Court Security Standards Committee or a subset of this body to promote timely implementation of the proposed court security standards, statewide information sharing and coordination of a systemic court security program. Such a committee could also assist the AOC Education Services Division on development of court security training curriculum and programs.
4. Institute an annual inventory of essential court security provisions to be completed by each court, as coordinated by the proposed county-wide court security committees and superior court presiding judges or their designees.
5. Include a method for assessment of court compliance with the proposed court security standards, particularly standards that require training, certification, and testing.

APPENDICES

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APPENDIX A: List of Resources Reviewed by Court Security Standards Committee

APPENDIX B: Survey Correspondence Examples

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- D-1 Security Audit Checklist and Report Template
- D-2 Sample Incident Report Form
- D-3 Security Incident/Negative Event Response Cards
- D-4 Sample Decorum Order
- D-5 Personal Security Tips for Judges and Court Personnel

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX B

The following is an example of the pre-survey email:

Dear Presiding Judges:

Court security has been identified as a high priority initiative and the Supreme Court established a Court Security Standards Committee to recommend court security standards for Arizona courts. In order to develop these recommendations, the Committee seeks your assistance in (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to the judges within your court (including judges located in other physical locations) and to other judicial officers.

The survey was created by the Committee with assistance from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and seeks to discover what security measures are in place in your building and what you believe are the most important security measures. Your court's participation in the survey will help the Committee to develop recommendations that are meaningful for Arizona courts, large and small, rural and metropolitan.

The survey **will be sent to you within 24 hours** and will take less than 10 minutes to complete. Please complete the survey at your earliest convenience, and no later than **Friday, May 6, 2016**, and forward the message containing the survey to the other judges and judicial officers in your court.

Court Administrators and Court Clerks will receive the survey as well and will assist with distribution to other court employees. *However*, if your court does not have a court administrator or clerk, the Committee would appreciate your help in distributing the survey to court employees as well as judges and judicial officers.

Thank you for your assistance in this endeavor,

The following is an example of the email distributing the survey:

Dear Presiding Judges:

In an email yesterday, the Court Security Standards Committee asked for your assistance (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to the judges within your court (including judges located in other physical locations) and to other judicial officers. This is the link for the survey:

[Court Security Survey](#)

Please complete the survey no later than **Friday, May 6, 2016**, and forward the message containing the survey to the other judges and judicial officers in your court.

Thank you for your assistance in this endeavor,

The following is an example of the reminder email:

Dear Judges, Clerk of Court, Court Administrator, Court Security, and Probation Chief:

In an email last week, the Court Security Standards Committee asked for your assistance (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to other judges, security personnel and staff within your court. It is important that each level of court (LJ and GJ) and each court location for those courts with multiple locations be represented in the survey results. It is also important that the survey reach someone who provides security for your court.

The Committee recognizes the time involved in taking the survey and forwarding it to others and sincerely thanks you for your willingness to participate.

If you have not had an opportunity to take the survey, this is the link:

[Court Security Survey](#)

The survey should be completed by **Friday, May 6, 2016**.

Again, thank you for your assistance,

APPENDIX C

APPENDIX D
Recommended tools for inclusion in Court Security Standards Manual

GLOSSARY

The following definitions govern the meaning of terms within the standards proposed by the Court Security Standards Committee.

Standard A court security standard is a policy or measure that is required to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

Guideline A court security guideline is a policy or measure that is recommended to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

Incident An incident is an action or communication that causes or threatens to cause personal injury, property damage, or disruption of courthouse proceedings

Hierarchy of seriousness of incident In descending order: (1) incident against persons, (2) incident against property, (3) threats without violence

High risk event These events can occur at any time and often arise with little notice to a court. The following characteristics are commonly associated with high risk events: multiple victims involved in the matter, incidents involving female victims and multiple offenders, homicides that involve intimate partners and family relationships, celebrated or featured articles or media coverage are associated with the matter, demonstrations may occur before, during, or after hearings or otherwise be associated with the events of the case.⁹

⁹ See National Association for Court Management, *Court Security Guide* p.24. June 2005

Negative event A negative event is an event that has potential to, or does cause interruption of court operations or poses a risk to the safety and security of those in and around a court facility. Negative events can include threats, such as threats to the physical safety of someone on or associated with a court, bomb threats, or suspicious or unattended packages; security incidents such as physical violence, active shooter, hostage taking; and other incidents such as cyber attacks, medical emergencies, fires, severe weather, or power outages.

Threat A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone (court employee) or an institution (court building) in retribution for something done or not done now or in the future. A threat is synonymous with a threatening remark, warning, or ultimatum such as a menace to a person or institution. A threat can be a person or a thing likely to cause damage or danger.

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE

Monday, September 12, 2016 – 10:00 a.m.

Arizona State Courts Building, 1501 W. Washington – Conference Room 119 A/B

Conference Call: 602-452-3288 Access Code: 8993

[WebEx Link](#) [CSSC Homepage](#)

AGENDA

- 10:00 a.m. Call to Order/Welcome and Introductory Remarks *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- 10:15 a.m. Approval of Minutes, July 26, 2016, meeting *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
 Formal Action/Request
- 10:20 a.m. Discussion and Feedback from *Marcus Reinkensmeyer*
Presentations to Standing Committees *Jennifer Albright*
- 11:00 a.m. Court Security Funding Strategies *Marcus Reinkensmeyer*
and Legislative Proposals
 - Court Diversion Fee
 - County Library Fund
 - Local Court Enhancement Fee

11:30 Lunch

- 12:00 p.m. Review of Draft Final Report *All*
 - Discussion on language and edits
 - Discussion of comments; notes; and data inclusion
 - Discussion of any final additions or deletions **Formal Action/Request**
- 1:30 p.m. Discussion of Next Steps *All*
- 1:55 p.m. Announcements/Call to the Public *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*
- 2:00 p.m. Adjournment *Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair*

Next Meetings: At this time there is no other meeting of this Committee scheduled.

All times are approximate. The Chair reserves the right to set the order of the agenda. For any item on the agenda, the Committee may vote to go into executive session as permitted by Arizona Code of Judicial Administration § 1-202. Please contact Jennifer Albright, staff to the Court Security Standards Committee, at (602) 452-3453, with any questions concerning this agenda. Persons with a disability may request a reasonable accommodation, such as auxiliary aids or materials in alternative formats, by contacting Sabrina Nash at (602) 452-3849. Requests should be made as early as possible to allow time to arrange for the accommodation.

COURT SECURITY STANDARDS COMMITTEE (CSSC)

DRAFT MINUTES

July 26, 2016

10:00 a.m. – 3 p.m.

Conference Room 119 A/B

1501 W. Washington Street

Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Present: Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Mary Jane Abril, Judge Kyle Bryson, Faye Guertin through her proxy Carla Boatner, Richard Colwell, Greg DeMeritt, Rolf Eckel, Joshua Halversen, Keith Kaplan, Judge Rob Krombeen, Tina Mattison, John Phelps, Captain Scott Slade

Absent: Sean Gibbs, Sheriff William Pribil, Sheriff Scott Mascher

Guests: Earle Lloyd, Superior Court in Maricopa County, Security Office

Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) Guest: Jeff Schrade

AOC Staff: Jennifer Albright

Call to Order/Welcome and Introductions

Marcus Reinkensmeyer, Chair, called the meeting to order at 10:02 a.m. Mr. Reinkensmeyer welcomed Ms. Carla Boatner, proxy for Faye Guertin, and asked members to introduce themselves to Ms. Boatner. The Chair then outlined the plan of action for today's meeting. He stated that he had some suggestions for consideration regarding a statewide court security fund and some additional recommendations related to funding at the end of the draft report for discussion. The Chair thanked Pima County for all the help that they have provided and acknowledged that Jennifer Albright has been hard at work on the draft report and is looking for additional resources for the report's appendices such as checklists and other tools.

Approval of Minutes

Marcus Reinkensmeyer noted that Jennifer Albright had a comment regarding the draft minutes and asked Jennifer to clarify. Jennifer stated that after discussing the draft minutes and the draft report with a member she noted absence of a recommended addition to the training related security standards in the draft minutes. Ms. Albright noted she made an addition under the heading Courthouse Security in the minutes. That edition reads: *"Recommend that AOC have approved training curriculum for court security officers and basic minimum standards for any private security companies that provide court security; provision for exemption if court security officer is AZ POST certified; consider grandfathering current security officers based on prior training and experience."*

Motion to approve minutes: Judge Bryson moved to approve the June 27, 2016, minutes as amended by Jennifer Albright. **Seconded:** Judge Krombeen **Vote:** unanimous

Prior to delving into the agenda items, Mr. Reinkensmeyer shared a couple of news items related to court security around the country:

Navajo County, Arizona – Mr. Reinkensmeyer recounted the shooting on the front steps of the courthouse just after court had closed. The National Center for State Courts went to Navajo County to debrief the staff on what happened and to provide suggestions on court security.

Berrien County, Michigan – Two bailiffs were killed and a sheriff's deputy was wounded by an inmate being transported from jail who was handcuffed in front and able to get ahold of the gun of one of the bailiffs. The inmate was later killed by a sheriff's deputy.

Coconino County, Arizona – Judge Krombeen discussed a difficult order of protection incident that happened in his court involving a retired police officer who was ordered to surrender his firearms. The defendant requested a hearing regarding the surrendering of his firearms and when the hearing was over the judge instructed the bailiff to escort the plaintiff and her sister to their vehicle before releasing the defendant. When the bailiff escorted the women to their vehicle he looked into the defendant's vehicle and noticed a couple of rifles in the backseat of the defendant's truck. The police were called and the defendant was detained in the courtroom, it turns out the rifles were pellet guns.

Mr. Keith Kaplan commented that after the incident in Berrien County, Michigan there was some local discussion on the reality that you can secure the court from weapons brought in from outside the court; however, you can't secure the court from weapons worn by armed security or law enforcement personnel in the court. He stated that the incident is something to keep in mind when the committee considered its proposed standard on armed security or law enforcement officers in court buildings.

Court Security Funding Strategies

Marcus Reinkensmeyer outlined a funding proposal for a statewide court security fund and asked for the committee's input. If the committee approves the proposal, it will be submitted to the legislative liaison for approval to vet with the legislature. Mr. Reinkensmeyer noted if the legislative proposal to create a statewide security fund was adopted, it would be the middle tier of a three tier court security funding structure. The three tiers were discussed.

Mr. Reinkensmeyer provided two examples of how existing funding sources might be used to fund the proposed statewide security fund. Neither of the examples would divert monies from existing projects or require new fees to be assessed.

One member suggested that the funding recommendation, as it would appear in the Committee's final report, should provide some guidance on the distribution structure of fund monies. It was suggested a formula be used that put small and large counties on equal footing.

Discussion was also had on the various types of funding available that could possibly be used to fund court security such as: local JSEF, Fill the Gap, and other funds to be researched.

The Committee reached consensus on the security fund recommendation and supported a legislative proposal related to creation and funding of the fund.

Review of Draft Standards

Marcus Reinkensmeyer asked the committee to vote regarding the direction of the draft report and allowing Jennifer Albright leeway in making edits to the report after the committee reviewed and discussed it during the remainder of the meeting. He explained the necessity of this being done so that a revised draft report could be taken to each of the standing committees for their input and support. The report would then be fine-tuned with any comments or suggestions from the standing committees and presented at the Committee's September 12th meeting for review and approval prior to being presented to the Arizona Judicial Council and Presiding Judges for their input and support in October.

Review and Discussion of Draft Report

The chair deferred to Jennifer Albright to go through the draft report section by section, focusing heavily on the draft security standards. Ms. Albright moved through each standard asking members to provide edits, comments, or other feedback. Ms. Albright either made edits on a working draft projected for the members to see or made notes on the recommended edits when there were more in depth. Once members indicated they had no, or no additional edits or feedback, then the next proposed standard was be addressed. In summary, the edits and recommendations were focused on language choice and organization.

The members did have in-depth discussion on the standards involving: court security assessments and the structure of those assessments; armed security and armed court employees in the court and training requirements for anyone who was armed in the court, whether court security of court employees; and possible addition of a standard requiring courts to conduct background checks on vendors and contractors or have such persons escorted through the court if not back ground checked.

After the members moved through all of the proposed standards, additional comment and feedback on the related recommendations section of the draft report were sought.

After discussion concluded on the draft report, the Chair moved for a motion on the draft report.

Motion: Judge Bryson moved to support the court security standards with the refinements discussed. **Seconded:** Greg Demeritt **Vote:** Unanimous.

Announcements/Call to the Public

No public in attendance

Next Committee Meeting:

September 12, 2016, 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.
Arizona State Court Building, Conference Room 119 A/B
1501 West Washington Street
Phoenix, Arizona 85007

Adjourned at 2:34 p.m.



Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

Report and Recommendations of the Court
Security Standards Committee, September 2016



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DRAFT



Court Security Standards Committee

Chair – **Mr. Marcus Reinkensmeyer**, Director of Court Services, AOC

MEMBERS

Ms. Mary Jane Abril

Court Security Manager
Superior Court in Pima County

Honorable Kyle Bryson

Presiding Judge
Superior Court in Pima County

Mr. Richard Colwell

Chief Deputy Clerk
Superior Court in Yuma County

Mr. Greg DeMeritt

Chief Deputy Clerk
Superior Court in Pima County

Mr. C. Rolf Eckel

Court Administrator
Superior Court in Yavapai County

Mr. Sean Gibbs

Director
Judicial Branch Security Dept.,
Maricopa County

Ms. Faye Guertin

Deputy Court Administrator
Chandler Municipal Court

Mr. Joshua Halversen

Court Administrator
Superior Court in Graham County

Mr. Keith Kaplan

Assistant Court Administrator
Phoenix Municipal Court

Honorable Robert Krombeen

Judge
Williams Justice & Municipal Courts

Mr. Scott Mascher

Sheriff
Yavapai County Sheriff's Office

Ms. Tina Mattison

Deputy Court Administrator
Juvenile Court in Pima County

Mr. John Phelps

Executive Director
State Bar of Arizona

Mr. William Pribil

Sheriff
Coconino Sheriff's Office

Mr. Scott Slade

Captain
Judicial Branch Security Dept.,
Maricopa County

AOC Staff

Ms. Jennifer R. Albright

Senior Court Policy Analyst
Court Services Division

Ms. Sabrina Nash

Administrative Assistant
Court Services Division

Mr. Jeff Schrade

Director
Court Services Division



National Center for State Courts

Mr. Timothy Fautsko
Court Security Consultant
Glendale, Colorado

Mr. Steven V. Berson
Court Security Consultant
Denver, Colorado

Mr. Kent Kelley
Senior Program Specialist
Denver, Colorado

Additional Resources

Mr. Earle Lloyd
Captain
Judicial Branch Security Dept.,
Maricopa County

DRAFT



Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

Report and Recommendations of the Court Security
Standards Committee, September 2016

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Creation and Charge of Committee

On November 25, 2015, Chief Justice Scott Bales issued Administrative Order 2015-104 establishing the Court Security Standards Committee. The administrative order directed the committee to: (a) develop and conduct a survey of court security measures in Arizona, (b) develop recommendations on standards for courthouse and courtroom security, and (c) develop recommendations on security officer training. The administrative order further directed the committee to file a final report and make recommendations to the Arizona Judicial Council (AJC) by September 30, 2016.

National Center for State Courts (NCSC) consultants Timothy Fautsko, Steven Berson, and Kent Kelley assisted the committee in its work. Based on Mr. Fautsko's recommendations, the committee established four (4) work-groups: perimeter, courthouse, courtroom, and training. The work group division was based, in part, on data reflecting where security incidents occurred in relation to the courthouse as demonstrated in *Status of Court Security in State*

Secure and Open Courts



Court security addresses the need to prevent disturbances and acts of violence that can impeded the administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution of the State of Arizona.



Courts.¹ Work-groups were essential for digesting large amounts of information related to court security measures and best practices as well as creating initial drafts of survey questions and the standards themselves. The report that follows consists of 30 court security standards and additional recommendations related to implementation of security standards, supporting structures to ensure continuous court security improvement, and funding proposals for the AJC's review and consideration.

Abbreviated Committee Recommendations

The committee's proposed court security standards and additional recommendations are set forth in detail in the body of the committee's final report. Following is an abbreviated list of the standards and recommendations.

- ❖ Adopt the proposed court security standards as mandatory standards for Arizona courts with a three-year implementation period. The standards address the following:
 - Governance and administration of court security, including policies and procedures, supporting committee structures, and planning;
 - Entryway screening;
 - Equipment, including metal detectors, duress alarms, and video cameras;
 - Protocols for prisoner transport and remand of litigants into custody;
 - Facilities, including courtroom security measures such as fortified benches, public service counter barriers, locking door protocols, window coverings, and courtroom sweeps;
 - Perimeter security such as lighting, signage, and protection of critical areas;
 - Training for judges, court personnel, and court security officers.
- ❖ Establish a statewide security fund that will be available to local courts for one-time outlays for security equipment and security system improvements.
- ❖ Provide dedicated state-level Administrative Office of Courts (AOC) staff support for coordination of court security assessments, technical assistance, court security incident reporting, and statewide training.
- ❖ Include a mechanism for assessing court compliance with the proposed court security standards, particularly standards related to training, certification requirements, and testing of equipment.

¹ Timothy Fautsko, Steven V. Berson, & Steven K. Swensen, *Status of Court Security in State Courts: A National Perspective* (June 2013).




- ❖ Establish statewide security funds that will be available to local courts for one-time outlays for security equipment and security system improvements.

INTRODUCTION

Court Security Today


Increasingly, court security is at the forefront of issues faced by every judicial branch in the United States. A March 11, 2005, security incident at the Fulton County Courthouse in Atlanta, Georgia, resulted in the deaths of a judge and a court reporter, shot in a courtroom, and the deaths of a sheriff's deputy and a U.S. Customs agent after the inmate fled the courthouse. That incident is often cited as the turning point for state courts and the issue of court security. However, ten years later, national and local data reflect not only an increase in security threats and violent incidents but also indicates that there continues to be limited funding available from state and local governments for security staffing, security plans, and security equipment.² Tragically, even as this committee was working toward its recommendations and drafting this report, the Superior Court of Navajo County in Holbrook, Arizona, experienced a shooting incident in front of the courthouse that left two family court litigants dead and one other injured.



² Timm Fautsko, Steve Berson, & Steve Swensen, *Courthouse Security Incidents Trending Upward: The Challenges Facing State Courts Today*, Future Trends in State Courts, 2012 at pp. 102-106.



In 2013, incident data gathered by the Center for Judicial and Executive Security (CJES) reflected, “the number of security threats and violent incidents in court buildings has increased dramatically in recent years.”³ The CJES Court-Targeted Acts of Violence (CTAV) study also examined where incidents took place. A subset of that data focusing on location of incidents from 2005 to 2012 revealed that the location of most incidents coincides with the locations where adverse parties and parties and victims are co-located.⁴



The Status of Court Security, an NCSC report, included national and local data from 225 court security assessment reports, data on security incidents gathered by CJES, a comprehensive web survey of state, local, tribal, and territorial courts, and a telephonic survey of court security directors. The report ultimately recommended the following future directions to improve court security in the United States:

1. accepting the challenge that doing nothing is not an option;
2. understanding that local, state, regional, and national communication and collaboration are key for success;
3. providing additional funding to improve staffing and equipment is essential; and
- 4 coordinating and supporting state court security programs is a definite need that must be answered.⁵

National studies and reports are not the only source of information and data related to the state of court security. Increasingly, state judiciaries and local courts are conducting security

³ Fautsko, *Status of Court Security In State Courts, A National Perspective*, at p. 7. See also CJES May 31, 2010 study on Court-Targeted Acts of Violence; Fautsko *Courthouse Security Incidents Trending Upward: The Challenges Facing State Courts Today*, at pp. 102-106.

⁴ Fautsko, *Status of Court Security In State Courts, A National Perspective*, Figure 4-2, pp. 4-6.

⁵ Fautsko, *Status of Court Security In State Courts, A National Perspective*, at pp. v-vi.



assessments, convening court security committees to study court security needs at the local level, and addressing funding needs associated with increased court security. One need only to peruse the internet to see examples of court security standards implemented by state and local courts around the country, news reports of security incidents, and information on the continued issue of lack of funding to provide adequate security staff and security equipment. It is against this backdrop that the Arizona Supreme Court's Court Security Standards Committee was created and against which it conducted its work.

COURT SECURITY SURVEY

Survey Methodology

The committee – charged with developing and conducting a survey - focused on two question types. The first assessed what security measures were in place in Arizona courts and the second asked how those surveyed felt about those security measures. Arizona's significant differences in population county to county necessitated demographic questions that allowed analysis of data based on court type, population center, and whether a court was located in a single-use or multi-use site. Analyzing response data against demographic data also provided the committee the opportunity to analyze the potential impact of proposed standards on courts.

The survey was distributed to all court levels in the Arizona judiciary: appellate, superior, justice, and municipal courts. The audience for the survey included judges and other judicial officers, court administrators, clerks of court and office staff, chief probation officers, and court security personnel and law enforcement.

Survey's were sent via email using a pre-survey email, a follow-up email 24 hours later containing the link to the survey, and a reminder email 48 hours before the survey closed. Presiding judges, court administrators, clerk of court, and chief probation officers were asked to distribute the survey. Examples of survey distribution emails are located in Appendix B.

Survey Development & Testing

Survey development involved a three-prong approach. First, committee members received and reviewed a number of resources including national reports on court security, questions used in other court security surveys, best practices for court security, other states' court




security standards, a summary of the state of court security in the United States, national surveys, and data on security incidents and threats across several decades. (See Appendix A.) Next, the work groups met during breakout sessions over the course of several meetings to develop lists of security measures and policies that the survey should assess. Finally, once the committee determined it had developed sufficient lists of topics and specific security measures to assess in the survey, committee staff developed a list of survey questions and NCSC staff developed a draft survey. Several rounds of drafting and editing occurred before the committee determined the survey was ready for testing.

Committee staff, NCSC staff, and selected court staff conducted tests of the survey. The first test revealed the survey took too long to complete. After additional revisions related to scope, language consistency, and conciseness, the committee approved and retested the survey. Based on the feedback received, final edits to the survey were made and the survey was approved for distribution. (See Appendix C for survey.)

Summary of Survey Results⁶

The survey was opened by 929 recipients and completed by 830 respondents with partial replies of varying lengths. The number of respondents roughly corresponded to the relative population of each individual county. Every county provided at least seven (7) responses, resulting



in representative data. Nearly 20% of respondents were judges, while 8% of respondents were court administrators. More than 800 respondents worked in courts where security was provided by court employed court security or law enforcement officers. Approximately 32% of respondents

⁶ Unless otherwise specified all references to data and survey results are from the Arizona Court Security Survey conducted by the Court Security Standards Committee in 2016.



worked in courts where a private security company provided court security and approximately 8.5% of respondents worked in courts with no security at all.

The community of respondents agreed that every proposed security measure included in the survey was either extremely important or very important. The category “unimportant” was never used by more than 2.43% of respondents regardless of the security measure proposed.

Although survey data revealed that respondents agreed on the importance of security measures in the court, it also demonstrated that a high rate of respondents “did not know” if those security measures were in place at their courts. One exception was to respondent’s knowledge of entryway screening. Survey results demonstrated that the majority of respondents were aware of the types of entryway screening that was used in the courts in which they worked. Although analysis of the data on entryway screening for the public demonstrated some type of metal detection device was used in courts where 85.5% of respondents worked, respondents working in rural courts (population 5,001 to 25,000) were the least likely to have any type of entryway screening (52.2% no metal detector; 65.7% no x-ray screening).

The committee used survey data to evaluate the impact of each standard on courts, taking into consideration fiscal impact, architectural considerations, and whether the proposed standard was focused on a security measure that would deter, detect, or otherwise reduce the most likely of security threats and incidents. The committee also used the data on court employees’ knowledge base in drafting its recommended standards on security training. Survey results for the question on whether respondents had been trained in the prior 18 months on various security measure and topics revealed that for most of the topics listed, less than 50% of respondents had received any training. This data was not surprising in light of the percentage of “don’t know” responses to many of the questions on whether security measures were in place in the respondents’ court. However, during the time covered by the training related questions, the AOC had instituted a required cyber security training as part of annual COJET training requirements and had recently disseminated an online active shooter training, also COJET credit approved. That 71.74% of respondents had completed the cyber security training and 52.81% of respondents completed the active shooter training indicated training is a key component to ensuring continuous court security improvement.





Comparison of population data to several common security measures revealed that certain security measures are present in the majority of courts, regardless of population or type of court:

- alarmed doors at entrances and exits,
- security cameras in publicly accessible areas,
- protective barriers at public transaction counters,
- employee offices can be locked from the inside,
- posted notice that firearms are prohibited, and
- assigned security personnel for transport and control of in-custody defendants.

Regardless of location or court type, the majority of court employees lack awareness of the following security measures, or their court lacks the following security measures:

- sheltering in place policies or procedures,
- lockdown policies and procedures,
- evacuation route information and procedures,
- regular sweeps of courtrooms,
- barriers to protect against vehicular assaults on the court building,
- bullet-resistant covering on windows and doors, and
- bullet-resistant materials at courtroom benches or courtroom clerk stations

Additional supporting data is included in the section of the report that contains the proposed court security standards.





COURT SECURITY STANDARDS

Preamble

Through its research and discussion, the committee concluded that court security could be maintained only through an ongoing process of continuous improvement. (See Figure 1.⁷) For a comprehensive approach, oversight of court security should also include business continuity planning and encompass emergency preparedness.

Proposed Standard 1 calls for the formation of standing local and county court security and emergency preparedness committees⁸ (“SEPC”). Composed of representatives of the court, law enforcement, first responders, and other stakeholders, these committees provide policy direction and planning recommendations on all facets of court security and emergency preparedness.

Specifically, as envisioned, the SEPCs conduct risk assessment, develop policies and procedures, establish deterrence measures, and conduct debriefing of security incidents in three interrelated spheres: (1) court operations, (2) facilities and equipment, and (3) training and communication. The efficacy of security policies and practices should be evaluated through periodic drills and audits. This ongoing process will provide SEPCs and judicial leadership with valuable feedback and actionable recommendations to maximize court security.

Continuous Improvement



“Security is not a one time achievement.

It is a serious and continuous goal and requires constant vigilance.”

Steps to Best Practices
for Court Security,
NCSC, January 2013

⁷ Continuous improvement framework adopted in part from: Marcus Reinkensmeyer, *Court Security and Business Continuity in Lean Times: A Collaborative Approach*, Future Trends in State Court Security, 2011.

⁸ Security committees are the number one foundational item in the National Center for State Courts. See, Nathan W. Hall, et. al. *Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security*, p. 3-7 (2016).




Figure 1

Proposed Court Security Standards

Several of the following proposed court security standards include comments that provide explanatory information, exceptions to the standard, or other important recommendations for consideration. The proposed standards may also include reference to survey data from the Arizona Court Security Survey or reference to other resources in support of the proposed standard.

Governance and Administration

1. Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Committees. The presiding judge of the county must establish a court security and emergency preparedness committee (county SEPC) chaired by the presiding judge of the county or a designee.⁹ The county SEPC shall consist of a representative cross-section of each local SEPC in the county. The presiding judge may appoint other members as deemed necessary. The committee shall meet at least twice a year.

The function of each county SEPC includes, but is not limited to, setting goals for implementation of court security standards adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court, review of

⁹ See AO-2005-32, Presiding Judges Authority (establishing duties over court security and facilities).



local court security plans and self-assessments, coordination of security needs countywide, and ensuring continuous court security improvement.

Additionally, each court building or court complex shall have a court security and emergency preparedness committee (local SEPC) that meets at least quarterly. The chairperson of the local SEPC shall be the presiding judge of the court or a designee and the chairperson shall appoint members of the local SEPC. Local SEPCs shall include at least one representative from law enforcement and a first responder.¹⁰ Local SEPCs shall meet at least quarterly.

The functions of each local SEPC include, but are not limited to, implementation of court security standards adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court within each court building or court complex; development and allocation of resources necessary for security needs; and coordination of security self-assessments, security drills, and testing of security equipment.

Comment: The committee recognizes that the make-up of SEPCs should be based on the needs of the varied geographical size and population of each county as well as the structure of each county's court system. Survey results indicate 57.8% of respondent court employees work in courts co-located in buildings with other agencies or entities. The likelihood that a security incident would impact other agencies or entities co-located with a court is therefore relatively high. The role other agencies or businesses may play in court safety and security is an important aspect of security and emergency preparedness planning that requires inclusion of representatives from those other agencies or entities. Therefore, the committee highly recommends that courts co-located in spaces with other agencies or businesses include a representative of those other agencies or businesses on the local SEPC.

“A court building security committee, meeting regularly and empowered to exercise oversight and sustain matters related to security within the court building, is a prerequisite to enable the court and its stakeholders to properly assess and address the myriad of security challenges facing court and stakeholder leadership.”

- Hall, *Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security*

¹⁰ First Responders as used here refers to medical and emergency personnel such as fire, rescue, or paramedic.



2. Court Security Manual. The Arizona AOC shall develop and promulgate a court security manual addressing the basic tenets of court safety and security. The manual shall include court security standards, security assessment tools, security incident and threat reporting forms, personal security tips for judges and court personnel, and templates for written policies on evacuations, hostage situations, sheltering in place, and bomb threats. The manual should also include practical tools, checklists, and templates for use by local courts. Each court shall add additional security related information unique to the needs and security plans of the court.

Comment: Because 57.8% of respondents work in courts co-located in buildings with other agencies or entities, the committee recommends courts invite those co-located in the building to participate in security manual training or receive a copy of the manual as appropriate.

3. Court Security Self-Assessment. Courts shall conduct a court security self-assessment at least

Nearly 61% of respondents worked in courts with written court security policies and procedures and approximately 97% of respondents indicated written policies and procedures were important, very important, or extremely important.

every three years.¹¹ The local SEPC shall conduct the self-assessment using a security assessment template or checklist and summarize the assessment in a report.¹² However, court security assessments may be conducted by an outside team with members who have knowledge of court security best practices or who are not employed by the court being assessed. Reports of court security self-assessments shall be shared with local and county SEPCs for use in developing plans for security improvement and for resource justification.

Recommendation: The committee recommends that a court security coordinator be hired within the AOC that would coordinate or assist in court security self-assessments and assessment reports.¹³

¹¹ Security assessments and security assessment reports shall not be open to the public pursuant to Rule 123(e)(4) (2016), Arizona Rules of Supreme Court.

¹² See Court Security Guide, 2005, pp. 6-8, National Association for Court Management. Committee members reviewed the detailed Court Security Assessment tool used by Pima County and its corresponding report template.

¹³ See Related Recommendations section of this report.



4. Response to a Negative Event.¹⁴ Court staff shall be trained on how to react to and report negative events. Each court shall have access to an emergency phone number or access and contact information for a control center operated by law enforcement.

5. Incident and Threat Reporting.¹⁵ The court administrator or lead clerk shall report all significant threats made against a court, a judge, a court employee, or a designee and all major incidents that occur within the courthouse or its perimeter. The AOC shall establish a process for reporting incidents and threats and shall develop guidelines for defining criteria for what is a major incident or significant threat.

Threat and incident reporting is of paramount importance to the safety of judges, court employees, and the public who visit the court building.

Recommendation: The committee recommends two levels of incident reporting: (a) contemporaneous reporting of major security threats and incidents to be defined by the AOC, and (b) annual reporting of security incident data by courthouse. Information from the first type of incident report shall be securely shared with court security and law enforcement officials in real time. The second form of incident reporting should include reports to local and county SEPCs and the AOC.¹⁶

The second type of report should serve as a basis for determining areas for security improvement and should provide resource and funding request justification from local funding authorities. Moreover, these reports should be required as part of funding requests from the statewide court security fund.¹⁷ This standard follows the national best practice of maintaining records of all threats and incidents for use in local decision-making related to security measures and funding.¹⁸

¹⁴ See the Glossary for definition of 'negative event'.

¹⁵ See the Glossary for definition of 'incident' and 'threat'.

¹⁶ Incident and threat reports are confidential and not open to the public pursuant to Rule 123(e)(4) (2016), Arizona Rules of the Supreme Court.

¹⁷ See Related Recommendations section of this report.

¹⁸ See Hall, et. al. *Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security*, pp. 9-10.




Entryway Screening

6. Entryway Screening.

(a) Entrances. Each court shall establish one main entrance through which the public can enter the court building. Additional entryways for the public are allowed if the additional entryways are staffed and use entryway screening of at least one hand held metal detector (magnetometer). Additional entrances may be established to comply with Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) standards; however, appropriate screening of individuals using such entrances is required.

(b) Screening Devices. Courts shall establish and maintain entryway screening of all visitors to courthouse facilities, using walk through or handheld metal detectors (magnetometers). For enhanced security, courts may also choose to use x-ray (fluoroscope) machines in conjunction with metal detector screening.

Courts that do not have a walk through or handheld metal detector at the time these standards are initially adopted shall obtain at least one hand held device for use in the event of a high risk event¹⁹ until such time as full time entryway screening of all visitors can be accomplished. Full



entryway screening of all visitors to the courthouse facilities by trained court or security personnel shall be implemented within the time set by the Arizona Supreme Court.

(c) Prohibited Item Signage. Each court building shall have signage posted at each entrance stating that all persons are subject to search by security personnel and that firearms and dangerous weapons are prohibited pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3102 (2016). Each court shall provide secure lockers at the entryway for storage of firearms pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-3102.01.²⁰ Law

¹⁹ High risk event is defined in the Glossary.

²⁰ See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102(A)(10) and Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102.01 (both current through 2016).



enforcement who come to the court for personal business²¹ rather than professional business shall be required to store their firearms in secure lockers the same as other persons.²² (See Standard 8, Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses for when law enforcement may carry a firearm in a court building.)

(d) Screening Device Training and Calibration. Court personnel or security personnel who conduct entryway screening shall be trained and receive refresher training on the operation of the devices that they use. Each court shall ensure that regular calibration and testing of metal detectors and x-ray machines occur.

(e) Prohibited items. Courts shall develop a list of items prohibited in the court building.²³ The list shall be a part of the local materials in the court security manual and all employees shall be trained on what are prohibited items.

Eighty-two percent of respondents work in courts where signage is posted indicating firearms are prohibited in the court.

Policies and procedures shall be developed for the confiscation, handling, and disposition of prohibited items found during entryway screening. Courts shall track the types and amount of contraband detected through screening and maintain monthly reports reflecting that information.

7. Court Employee Screening. In jurisdictions that do not conduct full entryway screening of all employees, each court must develop a policy on, and carry out, random court employee screening upon entry to the courthouse.

Comment: Unfortunately workplace violence is all too common. It is the risk of work place violence that can be mitigated through periodic employee screening for prohibited items.

²¹ E.g. party to a legal matter, witness in a legal proceeding in a capacity other than official law enforcement duties, or an observer of a legal proceeding where not involved in an official law enforcement capacity.

²² See Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32 and A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq. (current through 2016).

²³ See Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32 establishing authority for presiding judge of county over court security including prohibiting or regulating possession of weapons of potential weapons in the court; e.g. Superior Court for Pima County AO 2014-05 list of items prohibited in the Superior Court of Pima County; Arizona Supreme Court AO 1998-0008, list of prohibited items in the Arizona Supreme Court



8. Armed Court Personnel in Courthouses. The presiding judge of the county shall determine whether court security officers may carry firearms in the courthouse for the purpose of maintaining court security.²⁴ Required training as approved and provided by the AOC must be completed prior to actively carrying a firearm in the courthouse.²⁵ Moreover, courts with armed court security shall develop protocols for court security officer involved shootings.

Presiding judges shall establish written policies on the carrying of firearms for personal safety by judicial officers or other court staff. Specifically, the policy shall address the following points: who may carry a firearm, the process for registering or otherwise notifying the court and court security of the status of being armed, the process for confirming training requirements, type of firearm and ammunition that can be carried in the court building; and the conformance with all applicable state and local statutes and ordinances.²⁶

Comment: The committee recommends that courts adopt a policy prohibiting law enforcement officers from carrying firearms in the courthouse unless the officers are appearing for official business, providing court security, or responding to an emergency.²⁷ The committee further recommends all law enforcement officers who are allowed to carry firearms in the courthouse shall be required to go through a sworn registration procedure so that court security is aware of the officers' location in the courthouse and the official purpose for which they are present. As a general guiding principal, in policy formulation, law enforcement officers should not be permitted to carry weapons in the courthouse when they are present for personal business or in

²⁴ See Arizona Supreme Court AO-2005-32, Presiding Judges Authority (establishing duties of court security). Cf. Arizona Supreme Court AO 98-0008 (weapons in the Arizona State Courts Building); Superior Court of Pima County AO 2014-05 (weapons in Pima County Superior Court).

²⁵ This training requirement does not apply to law enforcement meeting the training requirements of A.R.S. § 38-1113 (current through 2016) or sheriff's officers who are present pursuant to A.R.S. § 11-411 (current through 2016).

²⁶ Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-3102(D) (judges carrying firearms in conformance with orders of presiding judge not subject to offense of misconduct involving weapons). Until such time as AOC adopts training standards, judges and other court staff authorized to carry firearms shall meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 13-3102(D) (current through 2016).

²⁷ See A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq. (authority to prohibit officers from carrying firearm unless appearing in official capacity or providing security or responding to an emergency).



a personal capacity, such as a party to a case or witness or observer to a case where they were not acting in an official law enforcement capacity.²⁸

In-Custody Defendants


9. Entrance for In-Custody Defendants. Courts shall ensure in-custody defendants are brought into and leave the court building through an entrance separated from any public entrance to the courthouse.

Eighty-one percent of respondents work in courts that currently have an entrance for in-custody defendants that is separate from the public entrance(s). Ninety-three percent of respondents found this security measure to be extremely or very important.

Comment: Courts that cannot meet this standard because of the architectural construction of a building shall have written procedures for ensuring that in-custody defendants are segregated from the public when entering and exiting the court to ensure the safety of all.

10. In-Custody Defendants; Transport and Control. In-custody defendants must be transported, controlled, and monitored at all times by appropriately trained court security personnel or law enforcement officer(s).

11. In-Custody Defendants; Protocols for Taking Individuals into Custody. Courts shall have written protocols for taking individuals into custody and securing individuals into custody for transport to a detention facility. Courts should make every effort to alert security personnel or law enforcement responsible for transporting detainees in advance if it is anticipated a litigant will be taken into the immediate custody of a county jail or correctional facility or otherwise taken into custody.



²⁸ See A.R.S. § 38-1113(C)(2) et. seq.; Arizona Supreme Court AO 2005-32.




Facilities, Alarms, and Equipment

12. Duress Alarms.

(a) *At Public Transaction Counters.* Courts are required to have at least one active and monitored duress alarm “panic button” behind each public transaction counter.

(b) *In the Courtroom.* Courts are required to have active and monitored duress alarm “panic buttons” at the judges’ or other judicial officers’ benches and at the courtroom clerks’ stations.

(c) *Training on and Testing of Duress Alarms.* The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall physically show all employees working in a court building the location of duress alarm “panic buttons” and how and when to use them. The court administrator, lead clerk, or a designee shall ensure testing of duress alarm systems occurs at least quarterly and that such testing is documented. Reports of duress alarm system testing shall be reported to local and county SEPCs and certified annually to the AOC.



13. Locking Protocols.

(a) *Locked Courtrooms.* Courts shall keep public doors to courtrooms locked at all times when a courtroom is not in use. Courts shall install or obtain a type of locking mechanism that will allow the courtroom to be locked from the inside to allow for the ability to shelter in place, but will also allow emergency exit, such as crash bars, one way door handles, alarmed doors, or remote locks.

(b) *Locked Jury Deliberation Rooms.* Courts shall keep jury deliberation rooms locked when not in use, unless jury deliberation rooms are behind secured areas.

14. Courtroom Sweeps. Bailiffs or designees of the presiding judge or court administrator, shall ensure sweeps of courtrooms and hearing rooms are conducted at least daily. Reports of courtroom sweeps shall be provided to the presiding judge, the court administrator, or a designee.



15. Secured Access to Non-Public Areas. Areas of the court not open to the public shall be electronic card-key or hard-key controlled. The court administrator, the lead clerk, or a designee shall ensure that doors remain locked at all times and are not propped open.

16. Security Cameras. Courts shall have video cameras in areas including, but not limited to, entryways and common public areas.

17. Exterior Lighting. Each court location shall have exterior lighting at building entrances and exits.

Comment: The committee recommends that where a court facility includes parking areas, such parking areas also have exterior lighting.

Eighty-eight percent of respondents work in courts that have exterior lighting, and the response was uniform across population and court type. However, only 38% of courts have barriers or other materials to protect court building from attack by vehicular assault.

18. Protection of Critical Locations. Where appropriate, courts shall ensure sufficient set back areas between the court facility and vehicle accessible areas. Courts shall prevent unauthorized vehicular access to critical areas with obstacles such as, but not limited to, bollards or natural landscapes.

Comment: Courts that cannot meet this standard because of the architectural construction of a building shall have written procedures for ensuring monitoring of areas where vehicle accessibility is within what would otherwise be the set back area.

19. Window Coverings. Court windows shall have coverings to prevent views from the outside into the court building. Window coverings must allow visibility from inside to the outside.

20. Creation of Barriers at Public Transaction Counters. Clerk transaction counters and public service windows shall have a barrier between the public customers and court staff. The type and manner of barrier shall be a local decision, based upon evaluation of each courts' design and operations.

21. Bullet-Resistant Material in Courtrooms. Courtroom benches and staff work areas in courtrooms shall be reinforced with bullet-resistant material.



22. Data Centers and Electronic Equipment. Court facilities shall maintain separate, secure electronic key-card or hard-key controlled, limited access areas for computer data centers, network equipment, video recording systems, and other critical electronic equipment. Courts shall maintain remote, off-site disaster recovery “hot sites” pursuant to ACJA § 1-507.

Training

23. New Hire Security Training Requirements. All court employees, including judges, shall participate in and complete, whether in person or online, a course in court security. That course should address general security principals, the court security manual, personal safety on the job, emergency preparedness including what to do in a negative event, evacuation routes, and sheltering in place protocols.²⁹

“Every single person who works on a court building has the potential to materially enhance the safety and security of his or her work environment, to be the “eyes and ears” of a workforce constantly alert to risks and threats. Judges and court staff that have been well trained on well-publicized policies and procedures provide the best means for this eyes and ears function to be effectively discharged.”

- Hall, *Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security*.

Comment: The committee recognizes that judges are subject to a separate orientation program pursuant to ACJA § 1-302 and that court security is generally addressed in that program. However, the committee emphasizes that court security is not a one-size-fits-all topic. As such, court security training provided to newly hired employees, including judges, should not be limited to a one-size-fits-all course that provides generalized content only. Each court will have its own policies and procedures on court security topics such as, but not exclusively: who provides security, what evacuations routes are, how to respond to negative events, who to report security threats and incidents to, and courtroom and courthouse lockdown procedures. In order for effective training to occur, each new employee, including judges, needs to receive training specific to the courthouse they will be working in. Therefore, the committee recommends that the

²⁹ The Committee notes ACJA § 1-302(J)(2) requires new hire orientation for all staff within 90 days of hire. The Committee recommends that an amendment be made to § 1-302(J)(2) reducing this time frame to within 30 days of hire.



AOC develop new orientation training on court security that has statewide applicability but that the AOC also work with local courts to develop guidelines for training specific to local courts.

24. Annual Security Training Requirements. All employees of the Arizona Judicial branch including judicial officers,³⁰ shall be required to complete a court security course annually as part of the COJET core curriculum.

Comment: The committee notes the current annual requirement of one COJET-accredited course related to cyber security for all court personnel and judges.³¹ The committee recommends a separate and distinct requirement for all judges and court personnel to complete one COJET-accredited course on court security each year. The committee recommends that statewide training courses and resources be offered by the AOC Education Services Division to complement local court training which may also be accredited to fulfill the annual COJET requirement. The committee recommends that the security training courses be different each year and recommends development of a series of security-related trainings to be offered on a rotational basis.

25. In-Service Court Security Officer Training. Court security officers employed by a court must receive annual training including, but not limited to:

- use of force training;³²
- metal detection devices and x-ray machines, as applicable to what officers use at their court;
- de-escalation and defensive tactics;
- active shooter;
- incident reporting;
- policies and procedures on the handling of prohibited items; and
- emergency preparedness.

³⁰ The committee notes the annual training requirements for judges set forth in the Arizona Code of Judicial Administration (ACJA). However, judges should receive the same amount of training as other employees because they are an integral part of security in the courts and they face similar security risks as other court employees. The committee recommends the ACJA be amended to include specific court security requirements for judges in keeping with the training structure set forth in the ACJA.

³¹ See ACJA § 1-302(H)(1).

³² The committee recommends that use of force regulations that are similar to ACJA § 6-112 be adopted for court security officers, excluding law enforcement whom the committee recognizes are governed by separate specific use of force laws and regulations.



26. Contract Court Security Training. Private contract court security officers shall be subject to the minimum court security training standards established by the AOC for in-house court security officers.

27. Security Officer Equipment Belt Training. Court security officers shall restrict equipment belt tools to items for which they are trained in the use of and where applicable, certified in the use of. Security officers shall restrict equipment belt tools to items approved by the court security officer-training program adopted by the AOC or otherwise designated by the AOC.

28. Courtroom and Jury Deliberation Room Sweep Training. Any court employee assigned to conduct daily courtroom and jury deliberation room sweeps shall be trained on how to conduct such sweeps, identification of suspicious items or conditions, protocols for reporting suspicious items or conditions, and securing of the courtroom or jury deliberation room if a suspicious item or condition is identified.

29. Court Security Officer Training. Court security officers shall be trained in accordance with a court security officer training program developed by the AOC Education Services Division. The Committee makes the following recommendations related to court security officer training:

- A security training workgroup should be developed to collaborate with the AOC Education Services Division to determine the specific training curriculum and annual training hours necessary for an effective, security officer training, education, and certification program.
- Trainers be approved by the AOC or AZ POST certified.
- There be a method for grandfathering current security officers if prior training or job experience meets the training requirements of any court security officer training program adopted or approved by the AOC.
- Court security officers, including contracted private court security, be readily identifiable via clothing or some type of marking on their clothing.

30. Firearms Training. Any person who provides court security to a court, excluding POST certified law enforcement officers, shall complete training in the use of firearms as designated by the AOC before being allowed to carry a firearm within the court.

Comment: The committee recommends that any person, whether court security armed for court security purposes or judges or other court employees authorized to carry a firearm for personal



security, complete training similar to that established for Arizona probation officers in A.C.J.A. § 6-113. The committee further recommends that firearms standards be adopted for armed court security, excluding POST certified law enforcement officers, that are similar to the standards in ACJA § 6-113. The committee recommends that the AOC Education Services Division develop such training and standards.³³

RELATED RECOMMENDATIONS

The committee considered a number of related measures to ensure a continued focus on court security and an ongoing program of security system improvements. To this end, the committee respectfully offers the following recommendations:

1. Given the additional resources and high degree of planning included in the implementation of proposed court security enhancements, the committee recommends a three year implementation period for the proposed court security standards.
2. Establish a statewide security fund available to local courts for one-time outlays for security equipment and security system improvements. Security system improvements entail, but are not limited to, security system screening equipment, panic alarms, public transaction counter barriers, bullet resistant courtroom benches, electronic door locks or similar locking mechanisms, video cameras, and communication systems. Specifically, the committee recommends expansion of spending authority for some current state and local fees for use toward security enhancements (e.g., court diversion fee; county law library fund; other funding sources to be identified). The committee also recommends that statewide security funds be distributed to local courts based upon need in relation to ability to implement the proposed court security standards. Under this model, the trial courts will continue to pursue local funding for court security personnel and ongoing operations.

³³ The committee notes A.R.S. § 13-3102(D) provides for judges to be held to the standard for those who obtain a concealed carry permit. However, the committee strongly encourages that all persons authorized to carry a firearm in a court, excluding law enforcement who have separate training standards, be trained and held to a uniform standard.



3. Provide dedicated state level (AOC) staff support for coordination of court security assessments, technical assistance, and training. AOC staff should also assist in oversight of compliance with any court security standards adopted by the Arizona Supreme Court. The committee notes that a staff member dedicated to court security would allow for court security to be pursued in an active rather than reactive manner. Core duties of AOC staff should include, but not be limited to:

- Develop statewide court security manual and accompanying resources
- Assist with creation of county and local SEPCs
- Coordinate court security assessments and post-assessment reports
- Administer an incident reporting system
- Develop compliance reporting systems for standards requiring reports and certifications.

4. Include a method for assessment of or accountability for compliance with the proposed court security standards, particularly standards that require training, certification, and testing.

5. Maintain the Court Security Standards Committee or a subset of this body to promote timely implementation of the proposed court security standards, address emergency preparedness policies and procedures, and statewide information sharing and coordination of a systemic court security program. Such a committee could also assist the AOC Education Services Division on development of court security training curriculum and programs.



GLOSSARY

The following definitions govern the meaning of terms within the standards proposed by the Court Security Standards Committee.

Standard - A court security standard is a policy or measure that is required to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

Guideline - A court security guideline is a policy or measure that is recommended to be in place in order to improve the general state of security in a court building and to ensure the personal safety and security of the public, judges, judicial officers, court staff, city and county employees and the law enforcement officers and court security officers that protect them.

Incident - An incident is an action or communication that causes or threatens to cause personal injury, property damage, or disruption of courthouse proceedings

Hierarchy of seriousness of incident - In descending order: (1) incident against persons, (2) incident against property, (3) threats without violence

High risk event – This type of event can occur at any time and often arises with little notice to a court. The following characteristics are commonly associated with high risk events: multiple victims involved in the matter, incidents involving female victims and multiple offenders, homicides that involve intimate partners and family relationships, celebrated or featured articles or media coverage are associated with the matter, demonstrations may occur before, during, or after hearings or otherwise be associated with the events of the case.³⁴

Negative event - A negative event is an event that has potential to, or does cause interruption of court operations or poses a risk to the safety and security of those in and around a court facility. Negative events may include, but are not limited to, threats, such as threats to

³⁴ See National Association for Court Management, *Court Security Guide* p.24. June 2005



the physical safety of someone on or associated with a court, bomb threats, or suspicious or unattended packages; security incidents such as physical violence, active shooter, hostage taking; and other incidents such as cyber attacks, medical emergencies, fires, severe weather, or power outages.

Threat - A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile action on someone (court employee) or an institution (court building) in retribution for something done or not done now or in the future. A threat is synonymous with a threatening remark, warning, or ultimatum such as a menace to a person or institution. A threat can be a person or a thing likely to cause damage or danger.

DRAFT



APPENDICES

Appendix A

Court Security Resources

Court Security Guide, June 2005, National Association for Court Management.

Business Continuity Management Mini Guide, June 2006, National Association for Court Management.

CCJ/COSCA Court Security Handbook: Ten Essential Elements for Court Security and Emergency Preparedness, June 2010.

Preparing for the Unthinkable: A Report to the Arizona Judicial Council, December 2003, Arizona Supreme Court Committee on Court Security and Emergency Preparedness.

Timothy F. Fautsko, Steven K. Berson, and Steven K. Swensen, *Status of Court Security in State Courts: A National Perspective*, June 2013.

Fred L. Cheesman, II & William Rafferty, *Courthouse Security Survey Pilot Project: Results and Proposed National Sampling Plan*, December 18, 2009.

Nathan W. Hall, et. al. *Steps to Best Practices for Court Building Security*, July 2016, National Center for State Courts.

Timm Fautsko, Steve Berson, and Steve Swensen, *Courthouse Security Incidents Trending Upward: The Challenges Facing State Courts Today*, Future Trends in State Courts, pp. 102-106, 2012.

Timothy F. Fautsko and Steven V. Berson, *Courthouse Violence in 2010-2012: Lessons Learned*, A Final Report, 2013.

Marcus Reinkensmeyer, *Court Security and Business Continuity in Lean Budget Times: A Collaborative Systems Approach*, Future Trends in State Courts, pp. 87-93, 2011.

Surveys

National Center for State Courts for the Bureau of Justice Assistance, *Status of Court Security in State Courts*, Web Survey Instrument.

Minnesota Judicial Branch, *Minnesota Courthouse Security Survey* by National center for State Courts.

State Court Security Plans, Manuals, and Standards

State of Minnesota, Conference of Chief Judges, *Court security Manual*.

[http://www.9-11summit.org/materials9-](http://www.9-11summit.org/materials9-11/911/acrobat/27/p3&c10emergencypreparednessplans/minnesotactsecuritymanual.pdf)

[11/911/acrobat/27/p3&c10emergencypreparednessplans/minnesotactsecuritymanual.pdf](http://www.9-11summit.org/materials9-11/911/acrobat/27/p3&c10emergencypreparednessplans/minnesotactsecuritymanual.pdf)



Michigan State Court Administrative Office, Court Security Guidelines, July 3, 2002.

http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/standards/cs_stds.pdf

Georgia Standards for the Security of Courthouses and Other Court Facilities, Revised June 2012.

www.cscj.org/files/download/courthouse_security_standards_final.pdf

Washington State Courthouse Public Safety Standards 2009, by the Board for Judicial Administration, Court Security Committee. <https://www.courts.wa.gov/newsinfo/content/pdf/securitystandards.pdf>

Ohio Court Security Standards, Ohio Supreme Court Advisory Committee on Court Security and Emergency Preparedness. <https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/courtSecurity/appC.pdf>

Colorado Courthouse Security resource Guide, Colorado State Court Administrator's Office, April 2008.

https://www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Administration/Financial_Services/Court_Security_Resource_Guide.pdf

Court Security and Emergency Preparedness Policy and Procedure Manual for the Arkansas Judicial Branch, Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Security and Emergency Preparedness within the Arkansas Administrative Office of Courts, 2013.

<https://courts.arkansas.gov/system/files/State%20Policy%20and%20Procedure%20Manual%202013.pdf>



Appendix B

Sample Emails from Court Security Survey Distribution

The following is an example of the pre-survey email:

Dear Presiding Judges:

Court security has been identified as a high priority initiative and the Supreme Court established a Court Security Standards Committee to recommend court security standards for Arizona courts. In order to develop these recommendations, the Committee seeks your assistance in (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to the judges within your court (including judges located in other physical locations) and to other judicial officers.

The survey was created by the Committee with assistance from the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) and seeks to discover what security measures are in place in your building and what you believe are the most important security measures. Your court's participation in the survey will help the Committee to develop recommendations that are meaningful for Arizona courts, large and small, rural and metropolitan.

The survey **will be sent to you within 24 hours** and will take less than 10 minutes to complete. Please complete the survey at your earliest convenience, and no later than **Friday, May 6, 2016**, and forward the message containing the survey to the other judges and judicial officers in your court.

Court Administrators and Court Clerks will receive the survey as well and will assist with distribution to other court employees. *However*, if your court does not have a court administrator or clerk, the Committee would appreciate your help in distributing the survey to court employees as well as judges and judicial officers.

Thank you for your assistance in this endeavor,

The following is an example of the email distributing the survey:

Dear Presiding Judges:

In an email yesterday, the Court Security Standards Committee asked for your assistance (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to the judges within your court (including judges located in other physical locations) and to other judicial officers. This is the link for the survey:

[Court Security Survey](#)

Please complete the survey no later than **Friday, May 6, 2016**, and forward the message containing the survey to the other judges and judicial officers in your court.

Thank you for your assistance in this endeavor,



The following is an example of the reminder email:

Dear Judges, Clerk of Court, Court Administrator, Court Security, and Probation Chief:

In an email last week, the Court Security Standards Committee asked for your assistance (1) completing a survey and (2) distributing the survey to other judges, security personnel and staff within your court. It is important that each level of court (LJ and GJ) and each court location for those courts with multiple locations be represented in the survey results. It is also important that the survey reach someone who provides security for your court.

The Committee recognizes the time involved in taking the survey and forwarding it to others and sincerely thanks you for your willingness to participate.

If you have not had an opportunity to take the survey, this is the link:

[Court Security Survey](#)

The survey should be completed by **Friday, May 6, 2016**.

Again, thank you for your assistance,

DRAFT



Appendix C
Arizona Court Security Survey

Arizona Court Security Survey



Dear Respondent,

In an effort to improve safety and security in our court buildings, the Supreme Court has established the Court Security Standards Committee to recommend standards and guidelines for court security. Standards are those security measures that would be required to be in place in every court building; guidelines are those security measures that would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

As an important step in this process, the Committee is conducting this survey to discover two things: 1) What is currently in place in the way of security measures?; and 2) What do you believe are the most important measures to have in place in your court building?

Please complete this survey and submit your answers by Friday, May 6, 2016.

Thank you,

Marcus Reinkensmeyer,
Chair, Court Security Standards Committee



Arizona Court Security Survey

- **Please Note:** If you have responsibility for multiple court building locations, please answer this survey for the location at which you spend the most of your time working.
- As feasible, users should access the survey on a computer, not on a cell phone or mobile device. If you use a cell phone or mobile device, some of you may experience input issues.
- You must provide answers to all of the questions before you can proceed to the next page.

1. Position Title

- Judge
- Other Judicial Officer (e.g., Hearing Officer, Commissioner)
- Judicial or Courtroom Support Staff
- Court Clerk
- Clerk's Office Staff
- Court Administrator
- Probation
- Other Court Staff
- Law Enforcement Officer
- Court Security Officer (Non-Sheriff Deputy / Non-Police Officer)
- Employee of another agency sharing building with court
- Other

2. County (select from dropdown menu)

3. Population

- Urban (population 200,001+)
- Suburban (population 100,001-200,000)
- Small Suburban (population 25,001-100,000)
- Rural (population 5,001-25,000)
- Small Rural (population 5,000 or under)



4. Type of court building

- Single use (court only)
- Multiple use (shared with other agency/entity)

5. Court Type

- Appellate Court
- Superior Court
- Justice Court
- Municipal / City Court

6. Who provides security for your court building (mark all that apply)?

- Court-employed security officers
- Sheriff's office
- Police department
- Private security company
- Don't know
- Have no security officers
- Other



Arizona Court Security Survey

7. Do you have the following security measures around the perimeter of your court building?

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras outside located around perimeter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alarmed doors, entrances, and exits	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entrance for in-custody defendants separate from public entrance	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Exterior building lighting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Barriers to protect against vehicular assault on building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant glass on doors and windows	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Window coverings to prevent views from outside into courtrooms, chambers, or offices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts



8. How important do you think it is for the the following security measures to be in place around the perimeter of your court building?

	Extremely Important (5)	Very Important (4)	Important (3)	Somewhat Important (2)	Unimportant (1)
Security officer(s) regularly patrol around perimeter of court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras outside located around perimeter	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Alarmed doors, entrances, and exits	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for judges	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured or monitored parking areas for court staff	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entrance for in-custody defendants separate from public entrance	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Exterior building lighting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Barriers to protect against vehicular assault on building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant glass on doors and windows	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Window coverings to prevent views from outside into courtrooms, chambers or offices	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



Arizona Court Security Survey			
9. Do you have the following security measures inside your Court Building?			
	Yes	No	Don't Know
Active security committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command center area	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras in publicly accessible areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public that includes a metal detector	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public that includes an X-ray machine	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for public that includes a hand wand	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Weapons screening for employees (including random screening)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees that includes a metal detector	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees that includes an X-ray machine	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Screening station for employees that includes a hand wand	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security for after-hour access	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

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	Yes	No	Don't Know
Duress alarms at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Protective barrier at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Policy or procedure for package and mail screening	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Building orientation procedures for first responders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Employee offices can be locked from the inside	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Policy or procedure for sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted notice that firearms prohibited in courthouse or courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Policy or procedures for reporting and evaluating threats and/or incidents	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

10. How important do you think it is for the the following security measures to be in place in your Court Building?

	Extremely Important (5)	Very Important (4)	Important (3)	Somewhat Important (2)	Unimportant (1)
Active security committee	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Written security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security command center area	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security cameras in publicly accessible areas	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Entry-way weapons screening for the public	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Weapons screening for employees (including random screening)	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular security officer patrols inside the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts



	Extremely Important (5)	Very Important (4)	Important (3)	Somewhat Important (2)	Unimportant (1)
Security for after-hour access	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security committee keeping track of incidents and contraband	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Protective barrier at public transaction counters	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Policy or procedure for package and mail screening	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Building orientation procedures for first responders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Employee offices can be locked from the inside.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Policy or procedure for sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted notice that firearms prohibited in courthouse or courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Policy or procedures for reporting and evaluating threats and/or incidents	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



11. Do you have the following security measures for your courtroom?

	Yes	No	Don't Know
Assigned armed security personnel presence in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increased security for high profile cases	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Assigned security personnel for transport and control of in-custody defendants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Decorum instructions/orders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted rules about cell phone use, including pictures and recording	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted information on evacuation routes or procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted information on lockdown procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted information on shelter in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: On bench	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: At clerk station	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In chambers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular "sweeps" of courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Keeping courtroom doors locked when courtroom not in use.	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



12. How important do you think it is for the the following security measures to be in place for your courtroom?

	Extremely Important (5)	Very Important (4)	Important (3)	Somewhat Important (2)	Unimportant (1)
Assigned armed security personnel presence in courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Increased security for high profile cases	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Assigned security personnel for transport and control of in-custody defendants	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Decorum instructions/orders	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted rules about cell phone use, including pictures and recording	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted information on evacuation routes or procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted information on lockdown procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Posted information on sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Ballistic-resistant material on bench/clerk stations	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: On bench	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: At clerk station	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In chambers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Duress alarms: In jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Secured jury deliberation rooms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Regular "sweeps" of courtroom	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Keeping courtroom doors locked when courtroom not in use	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



Arizona Court Security Survey

13. Have you been trained since January 2015 on the following topics/areas?

	Yes	No	Don't Recall
Written court security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Annual training on court security	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Threats against judges/judicial officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Active shooter/sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hostage-taking	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Phone tree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Incident reporting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Whose directions to follow if security incident occurs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Items prohibited from the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Safety at home/to and from work	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mental health identification	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De-escalation tactics	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suspicious package	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cybersecurity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



14. How important do you think it is for the following security measures to be in place in training programs?

	Extremely Important (5)	Very Important (4)	Important (3)	Somewhat Important (2)	Unimportant (1)
Written court security policies and procedures	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Annual training on court security	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of new hire orientation	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security training as part of employee transfer from another court	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Threats against judges/judicial officers	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Active shooter/sheltering in place	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Hostage-taking	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Phone tree	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Incident reporting	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Communications: Whose directions to follow if security incident occurs	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Use of duress alarms/testing of alarms	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Items prohibited from the court building	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Safety at home/to and from work	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Mental health identification	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
De-escalation tactics	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Suspicious package	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Cybersecurity	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>



Arizona Court Security Survey

15. How important do you think it is to have security standards and guidelines in every court building?

- Standards are those security measures that are readily achievable and would be required to be in place in every court building.
- Guidelines are those security measures that may take longer to achieve and would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

	Extremely Important (5)	Very Important (4)	Important (3)	Somewhat Important (2)	Unimportant (1)
Security standards	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security guidelines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

16. What do you think is a reasonable time frame (in number of years) for implementing security standards and guidelines?

- Standards are those security measures that are readily achievable and would be required to be in place in every court building.
- Guidelines are those security measures that may take longer to achieve and would be recommended to be in place in every court building.

	One year	Two years	Three years	Four years	Five years
Security standards	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>
Security guidelines	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>	<input type="radio"/>

17. When was the last time you had a practice evacuation of your court building (e.g., fire drill)?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't recall the last time



18. When was the last time you had an evacuation of your court building because of an actual emergency?

- Within the last year
- Within the last two years
- Within the last five years
- Can't recall the last time



Ensuring Secure, Open, and Publicly Accessible Courts

Report and Recommendations of the Court Security Standards Committee

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September 12, 2016